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 My dissertation includes three essays on bank liquidity creation and systemic risk. 
In the first essay, we examine the role of distracted institutional investors in banks in one 
of the most comprehensive measures of bank output, bank liquidity creation. We employ 
institutional investor distraction measure developed by Kempf et al. (2017). With a sample 
of publicly listed U.S. banks over the period of 1986-2016, we find that as institutional 
investors become more distracted, banks create more liquidity on the asset-side and off-
balance sheet side. These results are stronger for large banks relative to small banks and 
are more pronounced during crises and high uncertainty times. The results suggest a 
previously undiscovered outcome of institutional investor distraction with serious potential 
consequences for the financial system and real economy. 
 In the second essay, we investigate the effects of banking powers on bank liquidity 
creation and documents supportive evidence on the certification role of universal banking 
powers offsetting the conflict of interest view. We find that banking powers increase bank 
liquidity creation in the same country. The results are robust to subsample tests and 
additional controls. Also, we examine the effect of banking powers in home country on 
liquidity created by banks’ foreign subsidiaries in the host country. We find that higher 
banking powers in home country decrease bank liquidity creation of foreign subsidiaries 
in the host country. These results are supportive for international regulatory arbitrage in the 
financial services industry. 
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 In the third essay, we examine the effects of financial regulatory uncertainty on the 
systemic risk contributions of banks in the U.S. We find that financial regulation 
uncertainty leads to significantly higher systemic risk contributions of banks. Supportive 
mechanisms behind this finding are exacerbating bank loan portfolios and increased stock 
market volatility. Results are robust to endogeneity concerns. Therefore, regulators and 
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CHAPTER 1: DISTRACTED INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND 
BANK LIQUIDITY CREATION
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance plays very crucial roles in determining firm performance and 
value. One important element in shaping corporate governance of firms is institutional 
investors via their monitoring and disciplining. Their effect on corporate governance 
becomes substantial due to the increasing trend in their ownership in listed U.S. firms 
(Ivashina & Sun, 2011). As of end of 2017, institutional investors hold 72% of 10,000 
largest publicly listed firms in the U.S. (De La Cruz et al., 2019). However, monitoring and 
disciplining by institutional investors may be imperfect. Recent research suggests that 
institutional investors may become distracted, yielding some problematic consequences. 
For instance, Kempf et al. (2017) find that when institutional investors allocate less 
attention to a firm due to an attention-grabbing event in other industries, loose monitoring 
leads to managerial entrenchment in those firms. Private benefit maximization increases 
via granting opportunistically timed CEO stock options, and decreased possibility of firing 
the CEO after bad performance. Distracted institutional investors may also impoverish 
board oversight by appointing ineffective independent directors on boards and key 
committees (Liu et al., 2020). This situation leads to higher unexplained CEO 
compensation, lower pay-for-performance sensitivity for CEOs and thus, decreased firm 
value. Another impact of distraction on firms is that firms engage in more earnings 
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management activities after distraction (Garel et al., 2020). Also, Xue et al. (2020) find 
that we find that firm transparency is negatively affected by the distraction of passive 
institutional shareholders. Furthermore, there is a positive association reported between 
distraction and stock price crash (Xiang et al., 2020; Ni et al., 2020). Moreover, El Ghoul 
et al. (2021) report that distracted institutional investors lead to an increase in the cost of 
debt for firms. 
These studies focus on nonfinancial firms. However, it is important to analyze the 
effects of institutional investor distraction on financial firms for some reasons. First, 
financial firms are different than nonfinancial firms since they are highly regulated and 
may have access to safety net, which may cause moral hazard. Second, it may be argued 
that important negative consequences may also occur if institutional investors in large 
banks are distracted because of the important roles of banks in the financial system and 
real economy. Third, when it comes to financial institutions, there is an extra layer of 
stakeholders –supervisory authorities – that are already monitoring them. This may lead to 
free-riding of monitoring incentives provided by supervisory authorities by institutional 
investors. On the other hand, institutional investors may not free ride. First, it is important 
to note that monitoring incentives of institutional investors and regulators may be quite 
different. Institutional investors may be more profit-oriented while regulators are more 
prudency-oriented. This may lead them to prefer different points in the risk-return frontier. 
Second, especially large banks may have too-big-to-fail concerns and moral hazard 
incentives, which is an avenue for institutional investors to monitor besides the efforts 
supplied by supervisory bodies. All these points add additional complication and 
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interesting reasons to analyze whether institutional investors as one of the largest 
shareholders may or may not have impacts on banks besides the supervisory authorities. 
Therefore, in this paper, we investigate the potential consequence of distracted 
institutional investors in banks. In other words, this paper provides a test for examining 
whether the market discipline, Pillar 3 of the Basel Accord, functions effectively via the 
institutional investor monitoring. Do institutional investors contribute to the monitoring 
efforts of supervisory authorities, depositors, and other investors for banks to take actions 
to reduce their risk-taking? Distraction measure captures lower attention allocated by 
institutional investors to the stocks held in their portfolios due to an attention-grabbing 
event in other industries than financial services. Attention-grabbing event is defined as 
having the highest or the lowest stock return among twelve Fama-French industries. Our 
analysis focuses on impact of distraction on one of the most important and comprehensive 
measure of bank output, which is bank liquidity creation by Berger and Bouwman (2009).  
Banks create liquidity on the balance sheet by financing relatively illiquid assets 
such as business loans with relatively liquid liabilities such as transactions deposits (e.g., 
Bryant, 1980; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Bank customers may undertake their 
investments with the help of provided loans, the most common tool to create asset-side 
liquidity by banks. Deposits, the most common way to create liability-side liquidity, ensure 
the funds needed by the public to make purchases (Berger & Bouwman, 2017). Besides on 
balance sheet liquidity creation, banks’ off-balance sheet liquidity creation via loan 
commitments and similar claims to liquid funds leads bank customers to make plans 
regarding their future investments (e.g., Boot et al., 1993). Therefore, bank liquidity 
creation has substantially important positive implications for the real economic output 
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(Berger & Sedunov, 2017). However, it is important to be cautious about the negative 
consequences of bank liquidity creation especially on the asset-side and off-balance sheet 
side.  
The effect of distraction on bank liquidity creation is unclear ex ante. Lowered 
monitoring intensity on banks due to the institutional investor distraction may result in 
banks to live the quiet life and decrease their liquidity creation by avoiding risks (Berger 
& Hannan, 1998; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; Hicks, 1935). On the contrary, the same 
situation may lead banks to lower their quality of borrower screening and loan monitoring, 
which in turn, increases bank liquidity creation. Furthermore, institutional investor 
distraction may result in banks being less careful in their portfolio choices, lowering their 
credit standards, therefore, increasing lending, and perhaps creating excessive liquidity for 
the nonbank public. Excessive bank liquidity creation, especially off-balance sheet, is an 
early warning signal of financial crises, which have devastating effects on both financial 
system and real economy (Berger & Bouwman, 2017).  
Loan growth and excessive liquidity creation stand up as important drivers of the 
riskiness of banks (Foos et al., 2010). Banks become overly optimistic about the risk of 
loans issued during high loan growth periods (Fahlenbrach et al., 2017; Thakor, 2015). 
Therefore, low credit standards in lending processes during credit boom cycles worsen the 
ensuing financial crises (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012; Thakor, 2015). As noted by Berger and 
Bouwman (2016), high liquidity creation increases banks’ liquidity risk and credit risk. In 
other words, banks may experience tough times to meet their short-term financial 
obligations and their borrowers may default on their loans when banks create more 
liquidity. Moreover, asset-side liquidity creation may create asset price bubbles, which 
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increase the odds of buildup of a systemic event (Acharya & Naqvi, 2012). Therefore, high 
level of liquidity creation by banks increases their probability of failure, especially when 
the economy is overheating (Fungacova et al., 2013). Berger and Bouwman (2017) report 
that excessive liquidity creation, particularly off-balance sheet, is an early warning signal 
of a systemic event.  
The empirical analysis supports this hypothesis. Controlling for institutional 
ownership fraction and ownership concentration along with bank characteristics and 
aggregate demand for liquidity by firms, the results suggest that as institutional investors 
become more distracted, banks create more liquidity on the asset-side and off-balance sheet 
side. Specifically, banks hold less cash, issue more loan and loan commitments when their 
institutional investors are distracted. These results are more pronounced for large banks, 
which have important potential consequences for the financial markets and real economy. 
Moreover, decreased monitoring intensity by institutional investors may lead to more 
pronounced adverse outcomes during crises and high uncertainty times.  
Assessing the optimal level of bank liquidity creation and examining whether banks 
create excessive liquidity after distracted periods are not the focus of this paper. However, 
we find that after distracted time periods, banks’ nonperforming loans ratio increases 
significantly up to four quarters. This might provide a supportive evidence that distraction 
of institutional investors may have negative consequences on loan portfolio of banks at the 
margin. However, it is important to note that we do not find an evidence of a significant 
increase in bank risk measured via Z-score, or a significant decrease in bank profitability 
measured through return-on-assets (ROA) or return-on-equity (ROE) after distraction.  
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The results are robust after controlling for heterogeneity of institutional investors 
in their information-gathering and monitoring incentives via different types of institutional 
investors such as bank trusts and insurance companies, Bushee (1998) classification of 
institutional investors, and their investment horizon (Gaspar et al., 2005; Yan & Zhang, 
2009). Moreover, corporate governance may not be a third factor causing a match between 
distracted institutional investors and banks creating high liquidity since the results are 
robust after a horserace between proxies of corporate governance suggested by Bennett et 
al. (2003) and distraction. Also, after controlling for various internal corporate governance, 
our robust results suggest that institutional investor distraction is still an important factor 
on bank liquidity creation.  
Bank-level distraction measure captures exogenous variation in the representative 
institutional investor’s allocated attention which is orthogonal to the bank fundamentals at 
hand since the attention-grabbing sudden event occurs in an unrelated industry but not in 
financial services. Furthermore, we employ lagged independent variables in our regression 
analysis to mitigate any reverse causality concerns. Therefore, endogeneity concerns are 
mitigated. We include bank fixed effects controlling for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity to mitigate the concerns of selection bias. This eliminates the possibility of 
an unobservable time-invariant variable causing a match between a bank that is more likely 
to create high liquidity and an institutional investor that is more exposed to a shock in an 
unrelated sector. Therefore, the identification comes only from the time variation in 
otherwise two identical institutional investors’ monitoring intensity for otherwise two 
identical bank stocks held in their portfolios when the portfolio of one of the institutional 
investors is impacted by an industry shock. Due to the limited attention capacity of 
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institutional investors, their attention shifts away from the bank stock to the other stocks 
that received the shock. It can be argued that it would be costly to increase the attention 
capacity of an institutional investor in the very short-term after an industry shock (Kempf 
et al., 2017).  
This analysis on the impact of distracted institutional investors on bank liquidity 
creation contributes to different lines of literature. First, this study extends the research line 
on the role of institutional investors on bank liquidity creation, which may have 
implications for bank risk. In addition to their high ownership and stability highlighted by 
Deng et al. (2013), we put forward that their degree of devoted attention to the stocks has 
implications for bank output. Second, results add to the broader literature investigating the 
factors behind financial crises. Distraction of institutional investors may create a greater 
leeway for large banks to create more liquidity, which may lead to the buildup of systemic 
events, especially if their loan portfolios become risky. Results extend this line of research 
by providing evidence on the differential impacts of distracted institutional investors on 
small and large banks’ liquidity creation. This analysis also adds to Manconi et al. (2012), 
which state the role of institutional investors in propagating financial crises via liquidation 
of corporate bonds and retaining illiquid securitized bonds. Third line of literature in which 
this analysis contributes is the broader content of the role of institutional investors on 
corporate governance of firms, specifically banks. Monitoring role of institutional investors 
find supportive evidence through executive compensation (Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Kempf 
et al., 2017), board oversight (Liu et al., 2020) and CEO firing after bad performance 
(Kempf et al., 2017) in the literature. Results of this study strengthen the “monitoring view” 
of institutional investors through mitigating bank liquidity creation either directly by using 
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“voice” or “threat of exit” or indirectly via their impact on bank corporate governance 
(Callen & Fang, 2013).  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: The next section develops 
hypotheses. Section 1.3 describes the measures of bank liquidity creation and institutional 
investor distraction and provides the descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 explains the main 
methodology and control variables. Section 1.5 reports the main empirical results that test 
the predictions on the link between distracted institutional investors and bank liquidity 
creation, including subsample analyses, and alternative explanation. Finally, section 1.6 
presents conclusions, policy implications, and topics for future research.  
1.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We put forward two contrasting hypotheses on how distraction of institutional 
investors may affect bank liquidity creation. First hypothesis puts forward the arguments 
for why distracted institutional investors might cause an increase in bank liquidity creation.  
Distraction of institutional investors may mean lower monitoring intensity for 
banks (Kempf et al., 2017). As two different ways of monitoring and disciplining the firm 
management, institutional investors may use their “voice” or “threat of exit” (Hirschman, 
1970). Kempf et al. (2017) show that distracted institutional investors use less voice as they 
participate less to conference calls and suggest fewer proposals in the general shareholder 
meetings. Another supportive evidence on less voice used by institutional investors is such 
that they follow the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations more after 
they are distracted (Liu et al., 2020). They exert less influence on the firm management via 
their trading behavior. Therefore, distracted shareholders may exacerbate the principal-
agent issue between the shareholders and managers (Kempf et al., 2017). In this way, 
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corporate governance of banks may weaken, and managers may maximize their private 
benefits at the expense of shareholders. An evidence on managerial entrenchment when 
institutional investors are distracted is the finding of Kempf et al. (2017) such that senior 
management performs value-destroying and diversifying acquisitions. This study also 
highlights that CEOs obtain “lucky” (opportunistically timed) stock options after the 
distraction. Moreover, CEO turnover is lowered after a bad performance. In addition, Liu 
et al. (2020) find that CEOs have larger unexplained (residual) compensation, lower pay-
for-performance sensitivity. Furthermore, firms engage in greater earnings management 
practices, and thus, firm value decreases. It is important to note that residual compensation 
of CEOs is positively related to numerous risk-taking measures (Cheng et al., 2015). These 
cases lead to a decrease in firm market value. Therefore, distracted institutional investors 
may lead to undue risk-taking by bank management.  
Second, institutional investor distraction may weaken the corporate governance of 
banks via its adverse effects on the board of directors. Liu et al. (2020) report that distracted 
institutional investors may impoverish board oversight mainly via lowering both the 
amount and the quality of the voice boards use. Boards hold lower number of board 
meetings and independent directors miss board meetings more when institutional investors 
are distracted. Moreover, number of disciplinary votes that boards use in annual director 
elections to discipline independent directors, who reduce risk-taking (Minton et al., 2014; 
Pathan, 2009), and problematic directors is lowered. In addition, boards turn out to have 
more problematic directors through their reappointments or new appointments. Especially, 




Having independent and less busy directors on boards are crucial for risks taken by 
the banks. For instance, Yeh et al. (2011) show that independency of the auditing and risk 
management committees affects risk-taking behaviors and future performance of banks. 
Furthermore, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) display that banks’ exposure to mortgage-backed 
securities and risky trading assets is lower when their chief risk officer (CRO) is powerful 
and independent. These banks participate in trading off-balance sheet derivative securities 
less actively and they have lower default rates on mortgages and home equity loans (Keys 
et al., 2009). It is also important to note that directors of banks that have lent more sub-
prime mortgages before the 2007-09 financial crisis served on a greater number of boards 
(Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011). The reason is that busy directors did not have enough 
time to monitor banks’ risky lending behavior. Moreover, if members of the auditing and 
risk committees are too busy working on their other commitments, they may not allocate 
sufficient time to assess the situation of the firm thus, firms may easily take excessive risk 
(Mehran et al., 2011). Very unfortunate thing is that bank executives may engage in high 
loan growth without recognizing their excessive risk-taking as they underprice the loans 
and they are overly optimistic about the borrowers’ ability to pay the loans back 
(Fahlenbrach et al., 2017).  Therefore, these banks may end up issuing riskier loans that 
have higher default rates (Fahlenbrach et al., 2017).  
Finally, lowered monitoring intensity on banks due to the institutional investor 
distraction may result in banks to live the quiet life (Berger & Hannan, 1998; Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2003; Hicks, 1935). This may lead banks to lower their quality of borrower 
screening and loan monitoring, which in turn, increases bank liquidity creation.  
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In light of these arguments, we would predict that distracted institutional investors 
may conduct less monitoring and disciplining on either the senior management, or board 
of directors, or both potentially by exerting less voice and less threat of exit. This may 
exacerbate the agency problem between managers and shareholders and lead to managerial 
entrenchment. Thus, distracted institutional investors may increase asset-side and off-
balance sheet side liquidity creation. The “distracted shareholder hypothesis” is 
constructed as below:  
H1a (“Distracted Shareholder Hypothesis”): As institutional investors become 
more distracted, banks increase their liquidity creation, ceteris paribus.  
On the other hand, second hypothesis puts forward the arguments for why distracted 
institutional investors might cause a decrease in bank liquidity creation.  
First, lower degree of monitoring intensity and disciplining when institutional 
investors are distracted may lead managers to become less worried about overperforming 
their peers. This may eventually reduce risks taken by bank managers as they would prefer 
passive and quiet life (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003).  
Another possible reason behind lower bank liquidity creation when institutional 
investors are distracted is that even if institutional investors monitor and discipline the bank 
for stronger governance and more shareholder-friendly boards, this may still cause 
increased undue risk-taking by banks. Decrease in agency issue and improved risk 
alignment between shareholders and managers may cause an increase in risk-taking and 
systemic risk contributions by banks (Anginer et al., 2018; Gropp & Köhler, 2010; Iqbal, 
et al., 2015; Pathan, 2009). Banks may be driven by their shareholders to take undue risks 
especially in the residential mortgage loans for the sake of increasing short-run shareholder 
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returns (Conyon et al., 2011). Therefore, banks with stronger governance performed worse 
during the 2007-09 financial crisis compared to the ones with less shareholder-friendly 
boards (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012). Furthermore, Díaz and Huang (2017) report that firms 
with better governance and more shareholder protection create higher liquidity. 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) display that CEOs with better aligned risk incentives with 
shareholders undertook excessive risks ex ante unwittingly since these risks were 
considered as profitable for shareholders. However, these undue risks had unexpectedly 
worse outcomes ex-post. Therefore, distracted institutional investors may translate into less 
shareholder-friendly boards and lower bank liquidity creation via lower loan and loan 
commitments.  
As a third factor, institutional investors may execute expropriation (Callen & Fang, 
2013). In other words, they may lead banks to take undue short-term risks because of their 
pressure on banks to obtain more profits in the short-run. Their short-termism may cause 
banks to prefer loan quantity over borrower and credit quality. In this case, managers may 
hoard bad news about the firm rather than announcing them since they are scared that 
institutional investors may exit the bank stock (Callen & Fang, 2013). Even if the managers 
are aware of the risks involved in their issued loans, they may try to hide this fact to show 
off their short-run performance (Fahlenbrach et al., 2017). As a result, banks may 
experience higher stock price crash risk (Callen & Fang, 2013). On the contrary, when 
institutional investors are distracted, banks may not issue risky loans, and engage in high 
loan and loan commitment issuance. This may mean lower bank liquidity creation. 
In light of these arguments, we would predict that distracted institutional investors 
may either lead to quiet-life for bank managers, or low bank expropriation due to short-
13 
 
termism, or less shareholder-friendly boards. Either of them would lower the risks taken 
by banks associated with loan and loan commitments and liquidity creation. Therefore, the 
“quiet-life/undue shareholder-friendliness hypothesis” is constructed as below:  
H1b (“Quiet-life/Undue Shareholder-Friendliness Hypothesis”): As institutional 
investors become more distracted, banks decrease their liquidity, ceteris paribus.  
It is important to note that the effects of distracted institutional investors may be 
heterogenous among different bank size classes and different time periods such as crises 
times versus normal times, or low versus high uncertainty times. Therefore, we also 
conduct subsample analyses.  
1.3 MEASURES  
In this section, we describe the dependent variables and key independent variable 
for the main analysis and provide summary statistics.  
Comprehensive measures of bank total liquidity creation (LC(total)) and its 
components, asset-side (LC(asset)), liability-side (LC(liab)), and off-balance sheet-side 
(LC(off)) liquidity creation are dependent variables in the analyses. These measures 
indicate the liquidity amount supplied to the nonbank public such as firms and households. 
Depending on whether these activities contribute to or reduce from the liquidity created by 
banks, weights for a variety of on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities are 
assigned. Detailed information about the calculation of these measures and the items 
considered under each category are shown in Table 1.1. We adapted “catfat” measure of 
Berger and Bouwman (2009).1 Total bank liquidity creation, LC(total), is defined as the 
 
 
1 These data are available on Bouwman’s website. 
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sum of asset-side, LC(asset), liability-side, LC(liab), and off-balance sheet-side, LC(off), 
liquidity creation, where LC(asset) = (-1/2) x liquid assets + (+1/2) x illiquid assets, 
LC(liab) = (+1/2) x liquid liabilities + (-1/2) illiquid liabilities plus equity, and LC(off) = 
(+1/2) x illiquid guarantees + (-1/2) x (liquid guarantees + liquid derivatives).  
The reason underlying the designation of the above-mentioned weights is 
straightforward. First, weights are assigned to guarantee that all sources and uses of liquid 
funds are taken into consideration. Second, particularly +1/2 and -1/2 weights are assigned 
to ensure that increasing $1 of illiquid assets by decreasing $1 of liquid assets increases 
bank liquidity creation by $1, and the same holds for the other combinations of assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance sheet items. Last but not least, positive weights are assigned to 
the items that contribute to bank liquidity creation, yet negative weights are given to the 
items that reduce from the bank liquidity creation. For instance, banks reduce liquidity by 
holding liquid assets, such as cash and securities, and off-balance sheet derivative contracts 
with positive market values, such as interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange 
derivatives. Since these items subtract from bank liquidity creation, they are assigned 
negative weights. However, these liquid assets and derivatives can be raised by reducing 
illiquid assets, such as commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, so illiquid assets are 
assigned positive weights. Likewise, liquid funds can be increased by adding to the liquid 
liabilities, e.g. transaction deposits, thus these items are given positive weights. Illiquid 
off-balance sheet financial guarantees, such as loan commitments, are assigned positive 
weights because decreasing them would raise future liquid assets with the help of a 
reduction in future claims against them.  
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Placement of each item into each liquidity category of assets, liabilities, and off-
balance sheet activities in Table 1.1 are adapted from Berger and Bouwman (2009). Their 
measure places asset items into three different categories of liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid 
by considering the ease, cost, and time for banks to dispose of their obligations to get liquid 
funds, and similarly, liability categories also depend on the ease, cost, and time for 
customers to get liquid funds from the bank. Off-balance sheet items such as loan 
commitments and liquid derivatives are categorized similar to their on-balance sheet 
counterparts.  
We normalize the LC measures by gross total assets (GTA) in the regression 
analyses to guarantee that measures are comparable across banks, and the results are not 
mainly caused by the largest banks.2 Dollar values are adjusted to real 2016 values with 
the help of the implicit GDP price deflator.  
To test the hypotheses put forward in this study, institutional investor distraction 
measure defined by Kempf et al. (2017) is employed in this paper. This distraction measure 
is originally designed as an inverse measure of monitoring intensity allocated to a firm in 
a given calendar year-quarter by its representative institutional investor. Therefore, higher 
value of the Distraction measure means a lower monitoring intensity.  
An example could enlighten how this distraction measure captures the inattention 
paid by institutional investors to bank stocks analyzed in this paper. Suppose there are two 
identical representative institutional investors of two identical banks. First representative 
 
 
2 Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets (TA) plus the allocation for loan and lease 
losses (ALLL), which account for expected losses, and the allocated transfer risk reserve 
(ATRR), a reserve for certain troubled foreign loans. GTA incorporates the full value of all 
the assets that are included in the bank liquidity creation measures. 
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institutional investor holds bank stock 1 and an oil stock whereas second representative 
institutional investor holds bank stock 2 and a hotel stock. If there is an attention-grabbing 
event in the oil industry, first representative institutional investor would shift its limited 
attention away from bank stock 1 toward the oil stock. Meanwhile, second representative 
institutional investor would not change its attention level paid to bank stock 2. This time 
variation in how representative institutional investors allocate attention across bank stocks 
they hold in their portfolios is the identification source in this analysis.  
This measure relies on three conditions: 1-) whether an attention-grabbing event 
occurs in other industries other than financial services in this study, 2-) whether 
institutional investors consider this shock as important, and 3-) whether affected 
institutional investors are significant monitors. First condition specifies an attention-
grabbing event at quarter q in other industry than firm f belongs to. ISq
IND is an indicator 
variable, which equals to one if an industry has the highest or the lowest average stock 
return among all 12 Fama-French industries in a given quarter. As specified by Kempf et 
al. (2017), these shocks may occur due to a sudden and unexpected change in the 
competition, technology, demand, or regulation. Examples of these shocks are provided as 
follows: The 2007-09 financial crisis (industry return in 2007Q4 was -10.1%), the dotcom 
bubble (industry return in 2000Q1 was 14.8%), and oil crisis in Gulf of Mexico (industry 
return in 2010Q2 was -11.4%). The second condition is taken care of with the help of the 
weight of shock-occurring industry (IND) in the portfolio of institutional investor i at 
quarter q-1. This is denoted by wiq-1
IND. The logic behind this weighting is straightforward. 
The shock is expected to distract the institutional investor from monitoring firm f if there 
is a shock occurring in another industry other than firm f’s industry and if this industry 
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constitutes a big portion of this institutional investor i's portfolio. Up to this point, the 
heterogeneity of institutional investors is considered by checking their portfolios and 
creating the investor-level distraction score. From this point, one needs to aggregate across 
all institutional investors i of firm f. However, for the sake of heterogeneity of institutional 
investors in terms of their different portfolio holdings and incentives to monitor, a 
weighting scheme (wifq-1) for each institutional investor i of firm f is assigned. In this way, 
the third condition that whether affected institutional investors are significant monitors is 
taken into consideration. Two things are considered in this weighting scheme. First one 
(PFweightifq-1) is the market value of firm f in the portfolio of investor i. As firm f has more 
weight in investor i's portfolio, more attention in terms of time and effort would be given 
to that firm by that investor and that investor would have higher monitoring incentives 
specifically for that firm. Second one (PercOwnifq-1) is the fraction of firm f’s shares held 
by investor i. As investor i is one of the largest shareholders of firm f, managers may work 
in line with their biggest shareholder i. In order to mitigate the concerns of measurement 
error and outliers, all stocks held by investor i in quarter q-1 are sorted into quintiles 
(QPFweightifq-1). Likewise, each firm f’s shareholders are sorted into quintiles 
(QPercOwnifq-1). Lastly, the weights (wifq-1) are scaled to ensure that they sum up to one.  
Two equations below formulate the Distraction measure employed in this study:  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑞 =  ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑞−1  ×  𝑤𝑖𝑞−1
𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝐼𝑁𝐷≠𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑓𝑖∈𝐹𝑞−1  ×  𝐼𝑆𝑞
𝐼𝑁𝐷         (1) 
where Fq-1 specifies the set of institutional investors holding firm f’s stocks at the end of 
quarter q-1. INDf denotes Fama-French industry of firm f. ISq
IND displays whether an 
attention-grabbing event occurs in other industries, wiq-1
IND shows whether institutional 
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investors consider this shock as important, and wifq-1 indicates whether affected institutional 
investors are significant monitors. The latter can be formulated as follows in equation (2):  
𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑞−1 =  
𝑄𝑃𝐹𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑞−1+ 𝑄𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑞−1
∑ (𝑄𝑃𝐹𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑞−1+ 𝑄𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑞−1)𝑖∈𝐹𝑞−1
                  (2) 
where QPFweightifq-1 denotes the quintiles of the market value weight of firm f in investor 
i's portfolio, and QPercOwnifq-1 displays the quintiles of the fraction of firm f’s shares held 
by investor i.  
It is important to mention that as firm f’s own industry is segregated from the 
Distraction measure, attention-grabbing industry shocks (IS) are not mechanically 
connected to the fundamentals of firm f. In other words, these industry shocks cause 
exogenous variation in investor attention and monitoring. Following the Barber and Odean 
(2008), definition of an industry shock such that whether an industry has the lowest or the 
highest return among all industries has two substantial reasonings. First, increasing 
marginal benefit of unfolding the uncertainty during extreme return times may lead to 
higher investor attention to that specific industry (Kacperczyk, et al., 2016). Second, 
institutional investors may focus on these extreme return industries as the media covers 
their news more besides the extra attention given by the retail investors to these industries 
(Kempf et al., 2017).  
A potential concern might arise in reader’s mind about whether the effects of the 
industry shocks are prolonged enough to affect the monitoring capacity of investors. Yet, 
as explained by Kempf et al. (2017), there are two main underlying reasoning to support 
the hypothesis that they have long-term effects. First, investors may not fully unfold the 
truth about the event and fully unfolding may require more time than the event itself. 
Second, investors may need extra time to adjust fully to the unanticipated situation and 
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redistribute their attention across different industries held in their portfolios. Regarding the 
evidence on whether Distraction measure reliably measures the extent of which 
institutional investors are distracted, this paper kindly directs the reader to Kempf et al. 
(2017).  
Portfolio data at the investor level are gathered from CDA/Spectrum which is a 
database of quarterly 13-F filings of money managers to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. This database includes the positions of all institutions which have US$100 
million under management. These positions should contain at least 10,000 shares or 
US$200,000 in value. The detailed analysis of this dataset can be found in Gompers and 
Metrick (2001). Stock prices are obtained from CRSP and financial reporting data from 
Compustat.  
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in all analyses. Panel 
A reports summary statistics for dependent variables, key independent variable, and control 
variables.  
Dependent variables have 70,233 bank-quarter observations from 1986:Q1 through 
2016:Q4. Total normalized bank liquidity creation LC(total)/GTA has a mean of 0.292, 
suggesting that banks create liquidity of 29.2% of the gross total assets (GTA) on average. 
There is a big variation in liquidity creation across banks, displayed by the 25th and 75th 
percentile values at 0.166 and 0.416, respectively. The mean asset-side liquidity creation, 
LC(asset)/GTA, has a value of 0.007 with the 25th and 75th percentile values at -0.073 and 
0.089, respectively. The 25th percentile of LC(asset)/GTA is negative because a number of 
banks may hold more liquid assets (e.g., cash and securities) with an assigned negative 
weight to them than illiquid assets (e.g., commercial loans) with an assigned positive 
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weight to them. Mean liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA) is 0.202. The mean 
liquidity creation off the balance sheet (LC(off)/GTA) is 0.076.  
Turning to the key independent variable, Distraction has 70,233 bank-quarter 
observations from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. Microcaps, which are described as the stocks 
with market value below the 20th NYSE percentile breakpoint defined by Fama and French 
(2008), are excluded from analyses since most institutional investors do not take them into 
consideration. While it is not plausible to interpret its mean, the 25th and 75th percentile 
values of 0.108 and 0.174, respectively suggest that there is a considerable amount of 
variation in investor attention across banks.  
Table 1.2 Panel B provides summary statistics of bank liquidity creation variables 
by bank size class. Following the community bank definition of the Federal Reserve, we 
classify a bank as small if its gross total asset value is less than $10 billion (e.g., Whalen, 
2013; Lux and Greene, 2015). Large banks are defined as the ones with asset values at least 
$100 billion according to the threshold employed in the designation of systemically 
important financial institutions.  
Large banks create more liquidity per dollar of assets (LC(total)/GTA) than small 
banks, with most of the difference stemming from the LC(off)/GTA meaning that large 
banks extend relatively more credit off the balance sheet compared to small banks. Large 
banks also create more liquidity on the asset-side (LC(asset)/GTA) compared to small 
banks whereas their liquidity creation on the liability-side (LC(liab)/GTA) is less than that 





1.4 REGRESSION METHODOLOGY AND CONTROLS 
In this section, we describe the regression methodology and control variables for 
the main analysis.  







=  𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
               𝜃 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖,𝑡,            (3) 
where i indexes a bank, and t indicates a calendar year-quarter. The dependent variable is 
one of the normalized liquidity creation measures, LC(total)/GTA, LC(asset)/GTA, 
LC(liab)/GTA, or LC(off)/GTA. The key independent variable is the Distraction measure 
defined by Kempf et al. (2017). We employ one quarter-lagged independent variables to 
mitigate potential reverse causality concerns. Regression model includes a comprehensive 
set of control variables to separate the effects of institutional investor distraction. Bank 
controls (X) include Ownership (%), Concentration, Ln(GTA), sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio 
and HHI to consider differences across institutional investor ownership (percentage), 
institutional investor ownership concentration, bank size (and its squared term), bank 
capital, and bank-level competition measure, respectively. Demand-side effects coming 
from local market and corporations are taken care of by a set of state-level controls 
aggregated at the bank level denoted by W in equation (3). This set consists of Tobin’s Q, 
and Ln(Population), which are employed to control for state level measures of average 
Tobin’s Q, and population index aggregated at the bank level. Table 1.16 provides detailed 
descriptions of these variables. Finally, we include bank fixed effects (α) to control for 
omitted bank characteristics that are invariant over time, and time fixed effects (τ) to 
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account for macro factors that affect all banks. We cluster standard errors at the bank level 
to account for the correlations of error terms.  
Table 1.2 Panel A displays summary statistics for the control variables, as well as 
for the variables of channels and subsample analyses, and robustness checks.  
Bank-specific variables such as size and equity ratio are obtained from Call 
Reports. Population is collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The other 
control variable of demand for banking services, Tobin’s Q, is calculated for the firms in 
Compustat. This variable represents the corresponding weighted average value for a bank, 
where weights depend on the proportion of deposits in each area. Data on bank deposits 
for each bank branch can be gathered by employing two different data sources: Bouwman’s 
website from 1986 to 1993, and the Summary of Deposits by FDIC from 1994 to 2016. 
The degree of concentration of a bank in the markets is taken into consideration by 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Deposits Index (HHI), where the weights depend on the proportion 
of deposits of the corresponding bank in each area.3
Bank-specific variables such as institutional investor ownership (Ownership(%)) 
and institutional investor ownership concentration (Concentration) are computed by using 
the portfolio data at the investor level that are gathered from CDA/Spectrum, which is a 
database of quarterly 13-F filings of money managers to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Institutional investor ownership (Ownership (%)) is the fraction of a bank’s 
shares held by institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding of a specific bank 
at a given year-quarter. Concentration of institutional ownership (Concentration) is the 
 
 
3 Author acknowledges Berger, Guedhami, et al. (2020) regarding the state-level control 
variables employed in this paper. 
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Herfindahl index of the investor weights of a bank. The weight of an investor for a given 
bank is calculated as an investor’s share in that bank stock in the pool of institutional 
investors in a given year-quarter. These two measures of institutional investors are 
controlled in the regression models since risk-taking is higher in case there are institutional 
shareholders (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012), blockholders (Laeven & Levine, 
2009), and ownership is more concentrated (Gropp & Köhler, 2010).  
The average size of banks (GTA) is $10.529 billion.4 The distribution of bank size 
is highly right-skewed with the median value of GTA being $483 million. Thus, most banks 
are relatively small, but sample bank size ranges up to over $2 trillion. The average capital 
ratio (Capital ratio) is 0.058. The average HHI based on bank deposits is 0.118. The 
average Tobin’s Q of firms in the banks’ states is 2.074, which is comparable to the average 
of the full CRSP/Compustat universe (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). With regards to 
the institutional investor related bank-level controls, institutional investor ownership 
(Ownership (%)) has a mean of 0.375 and a standard deviation of 0.203. The mean value 
suggests that 37.5% of bank shares are held by institutional investors relative to the bank 
total shares outstanding on average. Concentration of institutional ownership 
(Concentration) has a mean of 0.689, which suggests that sample banks have significantly 
high level of institutional ownership concentration on average.  
1.5 RESULTS 
In this section, we present the results for the tests of Hypothesis 1 about the effects 
of distracted institutional investor on bank liquidity creation as well as its components. 
 
 
4 GTA shown in Table 1.2 is measured in $ billions of real 2016 dollars. 
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Furthermore, we display the main regression results after controlling for important 
institutional investor variables such as types of institutional investors, blockholders, 
Bushee (1998) classification of institutional investors, and investment horizon by Yan and 
Zhang (2009). We also discuss about the results on subsample analyses during normal 
versus crises times, low versus high uncertainty times and by bank size classes. Moreover, 
we show the results on a potential alternative explanation and discuss about further 
analyses. 
This section first displays the main regression results about the effects of distracted 
institutional investor on bank liquidity creation (Table 1.3), and its components (Table 1.4).  
Table 1.3 presents the coefficient estimates from regressions of normalized total 
(LC(total)/GTA), on-balance sheet, both asset-side (LC(asset)/GTA) and liability-side 
(LC(liab)/GTA), and off-balance sheet liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on distraction of 
institutional investors (Distraction) controlling for institutional ownership (Ownership 
(%)) and ownership concentration of institutional investors in a given bank (Concentration) 
as well as other bank-level and state-level controls. Regarding each of these liquidity 
creation measures as dependent variables, the odd-numbered columns display the baseline 
regression results whereas even-numbered columns control for other factors.  
In all these regression models, except the ones where the dependent variable is the 
normalized liability-side sheet liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), coefficient estimates of 
Distraction are positive and significant. Therefore, results may suggest that when 
institutional investors are distracted, banks create more liquidity (LC(total)/GTA) on 
average. The most comprehensive model specification in column (2) displays that this 
effect is highly significant at 1% level. One standard deviation increase in distraction of 
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institutional investors will lead to a 1.7% standard deviation increase in banks’ total 
liquidity creation relative to its mean. Regarding the asset-side liquidity creation 
(LC(asset)/GTA), coefficient estimate is also positive and highly significant at 1% level 
across all model specifications. One standard deviation increase in distraction of 
institutional investors will lead to a 55.4% standard deviation increase in banks’ asset-side 
liquidity creation relative to its average. Economic significance signals a large impact on 
the asset-side because observations are highly skewed and represent mostly the larger 
numbers of small banks that hold more cash and securities compared to lending. Therefore, 
the mean value of LC(asset)/GTA is very small. When we focus on the liability-side 
liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), there is not a significant impact of distracted 
institutional investors. The reason might be the fact that banks are active in making loans 
and loan commitments and they tend to be more passive in accepting deposits in the short-
term after the distraction. With regards to the off-balance sheet liquidity creation 
(LC(off)/GTA) in column (8), distracted institutional investors may have significant role. 
One standard deviation increase in distraction of institutional investors will lead to a 1.3% 
standard deviation increase in banks’ asset-side liquidity creation relative to its average.  
In Table 1.4, we present the results on the effects of distracted institutional investors 
on selected bank balance sheet and off-balance sheet components to help understand the 
channels behind the main findings. Results reported in columns (1) – (3) as cash holdings, 
security holdings, and total loans normalized by GTA, respectively represent the effects of 
distracted institutional investors on different components of asset-side liquidity creation 
(LC(asset)/GTA). Significant positive effect of distraction on asset-side liquidity creation 
reported in Table 1.3 is confirmed via its effects on cash holdings and loan issuance of 
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banks. We find supportive evidence that banks significantly hold less cash and issue more 
loans when their shareholders are distracted yet there is no evidence regarding the amount 
of securities they hold.  
Liability-side liquidity creation by banks is presented by deposits normalized by 
GTA (Deposits/GTA) in column (4) of Table 1.4. Insignificant results with regards to 
deposits are in line with that of liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA) presented 
in Table 1.3.  
Finally, when we investigate the effects of Distraction on off-balance sheet side, 
we find evidence on the positive effects of distraction on loan commitments issued by 
banks.  
Overall, these results are in line with Hypothesis 1a of “Distracted Shareholder 
Hypothesis”, suggesting that as institutional investors become more distracted, banks may 
increase their liquidity creation by holding less cash, issuing more loan and loan 
commitments, ceteris paribus. It is important to note that these results are robust to the 
addition of bank holding company dummy variable, which equals to one if bank is 
operating in part of a bank holding company, as one of the control variables.  
In this section, we also discuss about the main regression results after controlling 
for important institutional investor variables such as types of institutional investors, 
blockholders, Bushee (1998) classification of institutional investors, and investment 
horizon by Yan and Zhang (2009). 
As institutional investors may differ particularly in their incentives of information 
gathering, monitoring and disciplining, we control for the ownership of different types of 
institutional investors in Table 1.5: bank trusts (IO_Banks), insurance companies 
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(IO_Insurance_Companies), investment companies (IO_Investment_Companies), 
independent investment advisors (IO_Advisors), corporate (private) pension funds 
(IO_Corporate_Pension_Funds), public pension funds (IO_Public_Pension_Funds), 
university and foundations endowment (IO_Universities), and miscellaneous 
(IO_Miscellaneous). Presented coefficient estimates reflect the difference between each 
category of institutional investors versus the base group, which is miscellaneous. Results 
are robust as distraction of institutional investors has positive and significant impact on 
total (LC(total)/GTA), asset-side (LC(asset)/GTA) and off-balance sheet (LC(off)/GTA) 
liquidity creation. Similar to the main regression results displayed in Table 1.3, it does not 
have a significant effect on liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA).  
As banks (IO_Banks) tend to be passive monitors (Ryan and Schneider, 2002), they 
have positive and significant effects on total and asset-side liquidity creation by banks. 
Moreover, investment companies (IO_Investment_Companies) are positively associated 
with bank liquidity creation. This might be explained by their short-termism, which 
pressures bank managers to engage in high risk-taking to earn more profits in the short-
term (Callen & Fang, 2013). On the other hand, negative and significant coefficients of 
ownership by independent investment advisors (IO_Advisors) support that they have an 
active monitoring function (Cheng et al., 2011). Corporate pension funds 
(IO_Corporate_Pension_Funds) do not want to lose the business relationships with banks 
and this clientele effect may lead to significantly higher asset-side liquidity creation by 
banks. The effect of university and foundation endowments (IO_Universities) is positive 
and significant on total, asset-side and off-balance sheet liquidity creation as they may not 
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actively engage in monitoring due to their very low shareholding level (the lowest among 
all categories of institutional investors).  
In Table 1.6, we employ blockholdership (Blockholdership) as an alternative way 
to control for ownership concentration of institutional investors since higher risk-taking is 
reported by Laeven and Levine (2009) in the presence of blockholders. We find robust 
results after controlling for blockholders. Moreover, the effects of blockholders are positive 
and significant on total, asset-side and off-balance sheet liquidity creation. The reason 
might be the fact that bank managers are more induced to act in the interest of shareholders 
and take high risks when there are blockholders (Laeven & Levine, 2009).  
In Table 1.7, we consider the differential effects of institutional investors via their 
investment horizon and stakes in the banks. Therefore, we control for the ownership 
fraction of dedicated (IO_Dedicated, low diversification and low portfolio turnover), 
quasi-indexer (IO_Quasi-indexers, high diversification and low portfolio turnover), and 
transient (IO_Transient, high diversification and high portfolio turnover) institutional 
investors as defined by Bushee (1998). Results with respect to distraction are robust. 
Moreover, effect of transient institutional investors is negative for asset-side liquidity 
creation as supported by the evidence of Berger et al. (2021) since transient investors 
(IO_Transient) may discipline the management via threat of exit (Döring et al., 2021). On 
the other hand, threat of exit executed by dedicated institutional investors (IO_Dedicated) 
may not be considered as credible given their high liquidity costs that have to be undertaken 
if they sell their large amount of shares (Edmans, 2009). Moreover, quasi-indexers 
(IO_Quasi-indexers) may not have sufficient incentive to gather information about the 
bank in order to monitor the managers because of their passive and fragmented ownership 
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(Porter, 1992). Therefore, they have positive and significant effects on total and asset-side 
liquidity creation.  
In Table 1.8, as alternative definitions of institutional investor horizon, we utilize 
from the weighted churn rates of institutional investors (Churn rate) as well as short-term 
(Short-term IO) and long-term (Long-term IO) institutional investor ownership definitions 
by Yan and Zhang (2009). Results are robust with respect to distraction and the coefficient 
estimates are very similar to those presented in the main regression results in Table 1.3. 
Findings are also robust to the alternative definitions of investment horizon by Gaspar et 
al. (2005). These results suggest that long-term institutional ownership (Long-term IO) has 
positive effects on total and asset-side liquidity creation. The reason behind this result 
might be the impaired monitoring by long-term institutional investors as their relationship 
investing style may turn to be more of a mutually beneficial business with the bank 
management (Pound, 1988). However, even if long-term investors monitor and discipline 
the bank management, reduced agency problems would lead managers to act in favor of 
shareholders’ preferences toward more risky investments. Therefore, banks may increase 
asset-side and thus, total liquidity creation.  
In this section, we also discuss about the results on subsample analyses during 
normal versus crises times, low versus high uncertainty times and by bank size classes.  
It is important to address an important point about the results regarding the crises 
times. Distraction measure defined by Kempf et al. (2017) is not necessarily a missing 
value or equal to zero for banks during crises times. Instead, distraction is defined 
conditional on an attention-grabbing event occurring in one of the 12 Fama-French 
industries such that this industry has either the lowest or the highest stock returns in that 
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period. Therefore, distraction for banks may not be zero or missing value as other Fama-
French industries may have either the highest or the lowest stock returns during at least one 
year-quarter of financial crises times.  
In Table 1.9 Panel A, we show the main regression results during normal versus 
crises times, where crises are defined by Berger and Bouwman (2013). Results suggest that 
the effects of Distraction on total, asset-side and off-balance sheet liquidity creation are 
more pronounced during crises times compared to normal times. Moreover, these effects 
are statistically different from each other. Therefore, results during crises times are in line 
with Hypothesis 1a of “Distracted Shareholder Hypothesis”.  
In Table 1.9 Panel B, we display the main regression results during low versus high 
uncertainty times defined via financial regulation uncertainty measure by Baker et al. 
(2016). High uncertainty times are above median uncertainty times whereas low 
uncertainty times are below median uncertainty times in this sample. Results indicate that 
the effects of distracted institutional investors on total, asset-side and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation are more prominent during high uncertainty times compared to low 
uncertainty times. These effects are statistically different from each other. Therefore, 
results during high uncertainty times are in line with Hypothesis 1a of “Distracted 
Shareholder Hypothesis”. These findings are also robust with respect to economic policy 
uncertainty by Baker et al. (2016).  
In Table 1.10, we show the main regression results by bank size classes. Small 
banks are the banks with at most $10 billion of GTA as in Whalen (2013) and Lux and 
Greene (2015). On the other hand, large banks are the banks with at least $100 billion of 
GTA according to the designation of systemically important financial institutions. The 
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effects of Distraction on total and asset-side liquidity creation are positive and significant 
for both small and large banks. However, its effect is more prominent for large banks. 
These results are statistically different from each other. Moreover, unreported results 
suggest that for banks that have GTA over $10 billion, Distraction has a positive and 
significant effect also on off-balance sheet liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA). Therefore, 
results are in line with Hypothesis 1a of “Distracted Shareholder Hypothesis”. These 
results are robust to the alternative definition of large banks over $250 billion of GTA after 
the change in the designation of systemically important financial institutions under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  
Another subsample analysis is conducted across the different primary federal 
regulators of the banks. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises 
the national banks whereas the Federal Reserve System (FED) examines the state-chartered 
member banks. The remaining state-chartered non-member banks are regulated by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In Table 1.11, the results suggest that 
banks create more liquidity when the institutional investors are distracted as in the main 
results. Also, the FED’s monitoring incentives work more effectively than that of FDIC or 
OCC as the net impact of FED as the primary federal regulator is negative on all types of 
liquidity creation. These results may imply that the FED’s monitoring intensity provides a 
good way to deal with the negative impacts of distracted institutional investors on banks’ 
risk-taking incentives.  
In this section, we also show the results for a potential alternative explanation 
behind the findings of this study. One may consider whether weak corporate governance, 
as a third factor, may drive both distraction of institutional investors and bank liquidity 
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creation instead of being one of the potential channels behind these results. In other words, 
one may concern about whether institutional investors selectively become more distracted 
away from the banks with weak corporate governance meanwhile poorly governed banks 
create more liquidity. To mitigate these concerns, we execute a horserace between the 
distraction measure and the inverse measures of weak corporate governance proxies 
suggested by Bennett et al. (2003). Banks with less institutional ownership (Ownership 
(%)), less public pension fund ownership (IO_Public_Pension_Funds), and less long-term 
institutional ownership (Long-term IO) are more likely to suffer from agency problems. 
Results reported in Table 1.12 suggest that results are not driven by weak corporate 
governance as coefficient estimates of Distraction are statistically significant and very 
similar to the ones presented in main regression results in Table 1.3.  
Another important point to investigate is the potential non-linear relation between 
distraction of institutional investors and liquidity creation. In Table 1.13 Panel A, we 
present the results of a linear-log model specification to check whether higher institutional 
investor distraction may lead banks to create even more liquidity. The results show that if 
Distraction goes from 0 (total attention) to 1 (total distraction), the expected mean 
difference in LC(total)/GTA would be 0.076. As of its mean, this increase is 0.26 basis 
points, holding the other predictor variables constant. If the distraction goes from 0 (total 
attention) to 1 (total distraction), the expected mean difference in LC(asset)/GTA would be 
0.062. As of its mean, this increase is 8.81 basis points, holding the other predictor variables 
constant. If the distraction goes from 0 (total attention) to 1 (total distraction), the expected 
mean difference in LC(off)/GTA would be 0.015. As of its mean, this increase is 0.19 basis 
points, holding the other predictor variables constant.  
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In Table 1.13 Panel B, we present the results of a model specification with a squared 
term of institutional investor distraction. Results suggest that the impact of a marginal unit 
of increase in distraction on total liquidity creation (LC(total)/GTA) and asset-side liquidity 
creation (LC(asset)/GTA) is positive in the whole range of the observed level of distraction 
(Distraction) in our sample. There are only two observations as exceptions to this case.  
In this section, we also conduct analyses to examine the effects of institutional 
investor distraction on bank risk and performance. Moreover, we perform analyses to 
examine the relationship between this external corporate governance measure, institutional 
investor distraction, and bank liquidity creation controlling for various measures of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
In this section, we also analyze the effects of institutional investor distraction on 
bank loan portfolios, risk, and profitability. For brevity, we would only display the 
significant results of institutional investor distraction on nonperforming loans ratio of 
banks in Table 1.14. Results show that when institutional investors become more 
distracted, nonperforming loans ratio of banks (NPL/TL) increases significantly up to four 
quarters after the distracted period. It is important to note that the results do not provide 
enough evidence to suggest that institutional investor distraction leads to higher bank risk 
measured via Zscore or lower profitability measured by return-on-assets (ROA) or return-
on-equity (ROE). These results may suggest that distraction of institutional investors may 
lead to risky loans and creation of bad type of bank liquidity at the margin.  
In this section, we also investigate the association between institutional investor 
distraction as an external corporate governance measure and bank liquidity creation 
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controlling for various measures of internal corporate governance mechanisms reported in 
the literature.  
We conduct analysis for various board characteristics in Table 1.15. Panel A 
displays the results controlling for Governance Index (G-Index) developed by Gompers et 
al. (2003), which is an inverse measure of shareholder rights (or a measure of managerial 
power) in a given firm. Panel B shows the results controlling for Entrenchment Index (E-
Index) developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), which is a proxy for managerial power. Díaz 
and Huang (2017) display that banks with stronger corporate governance generate higher 
levels of liquidity. Bebchuk et al. (2009) Entrenchment Index is negatively associated with 
firm value and abnormal returns. Our results reported in Table 1.15 Panels A and B suggest 
that banks create more liquidity when their institutional investors are distracted even if we 
control for the proxies of corporate governance such as G-Index and E-Index.  
1.6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A very crucial factor in shaping the corporate governance of firms is institutional 
investors via their roles of monitoring and disciplining. Yet, monitoring and disciplining 
by institutional investors may be impaired due to their distraction because of an attention-
grabbing event in an unrelated industry (Kempf et al., 2017). This situation has adverse 
consequences on nonfinancial firms such as granting opportunistically timed CEO stock 
options, decreased possibility of firing the CEO after bad performance, worsening the 
board oversight and thus, lowering the firm value (Liu et al., 2020).   
If institutional investors in large banks are distracted, it may be argued that 
important negative consequences may occur because of the important roles of banks in the 
financial system and real economy. Therefore, in this paper, we investigate a very 
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substantial potential consequence of distracted institutional investors in banks. This 
distraction measure captures lower attention allocated by institutional investors to the bank 
stocks held in their portfolios due to an attention-grabbing event in other industries than 
financial services.  
We hypothesize that institutional investor distraction developed by Kempf et al. 
(2017) may result in banks being less careful in their portfolio choices and creating excess 
liquidity for the nonbank public. After controlling for institutional ownership fraction and 
ownership concentration along with bank characteristics and aggregate demand for 
liquidity by firms, results suggest that as institutional investors become more distracted, 
banks create more asset-side and off-balance sheet side liquidity. Specifically, banks hold 
less cash, issue more loan and loan commitments when their institutional investors are 
distracted. These results are more pronounced for large banks, which have important 
potential consequences in terms of causing financial crises. Moreover, decreased 
monitoring intensity by institutional investors may lead to more pronounced adverse 
outcomes during crises and high uncertainty times.  
Investigating the optimal level of bank liquidity creation and analyzing whether 
banks create excessive liquidity after distracted periods are not the focus of this paper. 
However, our results suggest that after distracted time periods, banks’ nonperforming loans 
ratio increases significantly up to four quarters. Therefore, there is a supportive evidence 
at the margin that distraction of institutional investors may have negative consequences on 
loan portfolio of banks. Yet, there is not enough evidence to suggest that there is a 
significant increase in bank risk measured via Z-score, or a significant decrease in bank 
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profitability measured through return-on-assets (ROA) or return-on-equity (ROE) after 
distraction.  
Results are robust after controlling for heterogeneity of institutional investors in 
their information-gathering and monitoring incentives via different types of institutional 
investors such as bank trusts and insurance companies, Bushee (1998) classification of 
institutional investors, and their investment horizon (Gaspar et al., 2005; Yan & Zhang, 
2009). Moreover, it is shown that corporate governance may not be a third factor causing 
a match between distracted institutional investors and banks creating high liquidity. 
Furthermore, after controlling for various internal corporate governance, our robust results 
suggest that institutional investor distraction is still an important factor on bank liquidity 
creation.  
This distraction measure captures lower attention allocated by institutional 
investors to the stocks held in their portfolios when there is an attention-grabbing event in 
any other industry than financial services. Therefore, it captures exogenous variation in the 
representative institutional investor’s allocated attention which is orthogonal to the bank 
fundamentals at hand since the attention-grabbing sudden event occurs in an unrelated 
industry. In this way, endogeneity concerns are addressed. In order to mitigate the concerns 
of selection bias, we include bank fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. This eliminates the possibility of an unobservable time-invariant variable 
causing a match between a bank that is more likely to create high liquidity and an 
institutional investor that is more exposed to a shock in an unrelated sector. Furthermore, 
distraction is likely exogenous because banks have well-diversified loan portfolios and 
generally not significantly affected by one industry, which may receive a shock.  
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These findings may have important academic and policy implications. Regulators 
and policymakers may consider the roles of institutional investors on bank liquidity 
creation. Policymakers may monitor loan growth, credit standards, and bank liquidity 
creation more cautiously when there is an attention-grabbing event in industries other than 
financial services. Roles of institutional investors in monitoring and disciplining the banks 
may be more prominent for large banks during crises and high uncertainty times. These 
findings may have implications on the role of institutional investors in help setting the 
market discipline and help controlling the moral hazard incentives of large banks due to 
too-big-to-fail. These results may suggest that there is a complementary role of institutional 
monitoring and regulatory monitoring. Therefore, institutional monitoring is an important 
factor to establish the market discipline, which is the Pillar 3 of Basel Accord, in the 
financial system. When institutional investors are distracted, supervisors could pay more 
attention to the financial institutions. Lower monitoring intensity of institutional investors 
may have a negative impact on banks’ stock prices and thus, banks’ capital buffers. This 
extra risk that we are not aware of before could be magnified especially during high 
uncertainty and financial crises times.  
These findings may arise new ideas for future research. We call for analyses that 
investigate loan contract terms to understand whether banks tightened or loosened their 
credit standards in response to various governance mechanisms executed by distracted 
institutional investors. Furthermore, types of the loans that the banks issue after the 








Table 1.1: Calculation of Bank Liquidity Creation  
 
LC(asset) LC(liab) LC(off) 
Liquid assets  
(weight = - 1/2) 
Illiquid assets  
(weight = + 1/2) 
Liquid liabilities  
(weight = + 1/2) 
Illiquid liabilities plus 
equity  
(weight = + 1/2) 
Illiquid 
guarantees 
(weight = + 
1/2) 
Liquid guarantees and 
liquid derivatives  
(weight = - 1/2) 
Cash and due 
from other 
institutions  
Commercial real estate 
loans (CRE)  
Transactions 
deposits  






All securities  
(regardless of 
maturity)  
Loans to finance 
agricultural production  
Savings deposits  Subordinated debt Net standby 
letters of 
credit  
Interest rate derivatives  
Trading assets  Commercial and 










Fed funds sold  Other loans and lease 
financing receivables  
Trading 
liabilities  




Equity and commodity 
derivatives  
 Other real estate 
owned (OREO)  
    
 Customers’ liability on 
bankers acceptances  
    
 Investment in 
unconsolidated 
subsidiaries  
    
 Intangible assets      
 Premises      







This table presents classifications of various balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities used to build the bank liquidity creation 
measures (specifically, “catfat” measure of Berger and Bouwman (2009)). We assign positive weights (+1/2) to items contributing to 
liquidity creation by banks, and negative weights (-1/2) to items reducing liquidity creation by banks. Total bank liquidity creation, 
LC(total) = LC(asset) + LC(liab) + LC(off), where LC(asset) = (-1/2) × liquid assets + (+1/2) × illiquid assets, LC(liab) = (+1/2) × liquid 





















Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for variables  
 N Mean StDev 25th 
Percentile  
Median  75th 
Percentile 
Dependent variables        
LC(total) / GTA  70,233 0.292 0.185 0.166 0.285 0.416 
LC(asset) / GTA  70,233 0.007 0.130 -0.073 0.010 0.089 
LC (liab) / GTA  70,233 0.202 0.065 0.162 0.203 0.244 
LC (off) / GTA  70,233 0.076 0.060 0.029 0.060 0.107 
Key independent variable (lagged) 
Distraction 70,233 0.139 0.057 0.108 0.139 0.174 
Control variables (lagged) 
Ownership (%) 70,233 0.375 0.203 0.228 0.368 0.505 
Concentration 70,233 0.689 0.594 0.304 0.490 0.868 
GTA ($ billions) 70,233 10.529 80.540 0.185 0.483 2.685 
Capital ratio  70,233 0.058 0.027 0.040 0.051 0.065 
HHI  70,233 0.118 0.103 0.046 0.101 0.157 
Tobin’s Q  70,233 2.074 0.780 1.645 1.878 2.265 
Ln(Population) 70,233 1.817 0.832 1.421 1.786 2.439 
Variables for robustness checks 
(lagged)       
Blockholdership 70,233 0.080 0.082 0.000 0.068 0.129 
IO_Banks 70,233 0.134 0.073 0.082 0.130 0.176 
IO_Insurance_Companies 70,233 0.027 0.025 0.006 0.022 0.041 
IO_Investment_Companies 70,233 0.042 0.041 0.008 0.031 0.065 
IO_Advisors 70,233 0.143 0.117 0.058 0.118 0.195 
IO_Corporate_Pension_Funds 70,233 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.007 
IO_Public_Pension_Funds 70,233 0.018 0.017 0.004 0.014 0.026 









IO_Miscellaneous 70,233 0.004 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IO_Dedicated 70,233 0.063 0.067 0.009 0.045 0.097 
IO_Quasi-indexers 70,233 0.246 0.142 0.145 0.238 0.330 
IO_Transient 70,233 0.062 0.062 0.015 0.041 0.090 
Churn rate 70,233 0.051 0.014 0.042 0.052 0.060 
Short-term IO 70,233 0.123 0.099 0.039 0.103 0.191 
Long-term IO 70,233 0.119 0.079 0.057 0.107 0.160 
Variables for channels       
Cash/GTA  70,233 0.060 0.048 0.031 0.046 0.071 
Securities/GTA  70,233 0.225 0.134 0.132 0.208 0.299 
Loans/GTA  70,233 0.400 0.131 0.322 0.399 0.480 
Deposits/GTA  70,233 0.805 0.129 0.766 0.842 0.887 
Loan cmt./GTA  70,233 0.136 0.108 0.053 0.110 0.195 
Variables for subsamples       
Crises dummy 70,233 0.348 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 
High uncertainty dummy 70,233 0.494 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Variables for further analyses       
NPL/TL 70,233 0.014 0.017 0.004 0.008 0.017 
G-Index 7,630 9.545 2.957 7.000 9.000 12.000 







Panel B: Descriptive statistics for dependent and key independent variables by bank size 
 
This table presents summary statistics, and size classes for the variables employed in the analyses. The sample includes 3,860 banks 
from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. Observations are at bank-calendar-quarter level. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all the 
variables used in the analyses whereas Panel B provides descriptive statistics for dependent and key independent variables by bank size. 
Banks are categorized into size classes based on gross total assets (GTA). Small banks are the banks with GTA less than $10 billion 
(Whalen, 2013; Lux and Greene, 2015) whereas large banks have at least $100 billion of GTA according to the threshold of systemically 
important financial institution. All dollar values are adjusted to real 2016 values using the implicit GDP price deflator. All control 
















GTA < $10 billion 
Large banks 
GTA ≥ $100 billion 
  
N Mean StDev N Mean StDev 
 
LC(total) / GTA  62,496 0.273 0.176 1,205 0.421 0.221 
LC(asset) / GTA  62,496 0.001 0.129 1,205 0.016 0.144 
LC (liab) / GTA  62,496 0.202 0.063 1,205 0.153 0.082 
LC (off) / GTA  62,496 0.066 0.053 1,205 0.190 0.041 








Table 1.3: Institutional Investor Distraction on Bank Liquidity Creation  
         
  LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC (liab) / GTA LC (off) / GTA 
Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Distraction 0.107*** 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.068*** -0.006 -0.006 0.022** 0.017** 
 (3.43) (3.03) (3.37) (2.91) (-0.57) (-0.61) (2.41) (1.97) 
Ownership (%)  0.015  0.017  -0.004  0.004 
  (0.81)  (1.30)  (-0.68)  (0.71) 
Concentration  0.009*  0.002  0.000  0.003** 
  (1.67)  (0.45)  (0.34)  (2.22) 
Ln(GTA)  0.041***  0.026***  0.004  0.010*** 
  (3.42)  (3.69)  (1.03)  (3.09) 
Sqr. Ln(GTA)  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.000 
  (-3.06)  (-3.00)  (-4.23)  (-1.47) 
Capital ratio  -0.425**  0.489***  -0.831***  0.022 
  (-2.33)  (4.50)  (-16.10)  (0.41) 
HHI  0.018  -0.002  0.013**  0.007 
  (0.96)  (-0.12)  (2.40)  (1.31) 
Tobin’s Q  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001* 
  (0.59)  (0.39)  (0.66)  (1.78) 
Ln(Population)  0.032**  0.024**  0.002  0.004 
  (2.19)  (2.02)  (0.49)  (1.32) 
         
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 
Adj.R-squared 0.807 0.812 0.793 0.798 0.785 0.809 0.799 0.801 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets (LC(total) / 








sheet liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA), respectively, on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) without controls in odd-numbered 
columns and with controls in even-numbered columns. The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All variables 
are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and independent variables are lagged one quarter. Coefficients on constant terms are omitted for 
brevity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical significance at the 







Table 1.4: Institutional Investor Distraction on Selected Balance Sheet Items 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables Cash/GTA Securities/GTA Loans/GTA Deposits/GTA Loan cmt./GTA 
      
Distraction -0.031*** 0.012 0.040** -0.030 0.037** 
 (-3.192) (0.491) (2.216) (-1.560) (2.198) 
Ownership (%) -0.031*** 0.018 -0.004 -0.024** 0.005 
 (-4.913) (1.228) (-0.399) (-2.337) (0.469) 
Concentration -0.001 -0.003 -0.006** -0.009*** 0.005* 
 (-0.893) (-1.096) (-2.227) (-3.807) (1.772) 
Ln(GTA) 0.002 -0.013** 0.010* -0.029*** 0.014** 
 (0.721) (-2.361) (1.729) (-4.156) (2.408) 
Sqr. Ln(GTA) -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-2.667) (4.059) (-0.513) (1.015) (-0.872) 
Capital ratio 0.003 -0.399*** -0.330*** -0.513*** 0.034 
 (0.062) (-3.811) (-3.251) (-4.383) (0.352) 
HHI -0.003 0.009 0.008 0.031*** 0.016 
 (-0.547) (0.665) (0.619) (2.898) (1.583) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002* 
 (2.718) (-1.004) (-0.691) (-0.030) (1.941) 
Ln(Population) -0.005 0.001 0.021** 0.005 0.008 
 (-1.236) (0.136) (2.382) (0.826) (1.178) 
      
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 








This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of selected bank balance sheet and off-balance sheet categories normalized by 
gross total assets (GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction), and controls. The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 
through 2016:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and independent variables are lagged one quarter. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 







Table 1.5: Controlling for Types of Institutional Investors  
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LC(total)/GTA  LC(asset)/GTA  LC (liab)/GTA  LC (off)/GTA  
          
Distraction 0.086*** 0.063*** -0.005 0.018** 
 (3.04) (2.75) (-0.51) (2.06) 
IO_Banks 0.094*** 0.076*** 0.016 0.003 
 (2.65) (3.09) (1.48) (0.34) 
IO_Insurance_Companies -0.063 0.024 -0.048 -0.020 
 (-0.64) (0.39) (-1.26) (-0.74) 
IO_Investment_Companies 0.116* -0.020 0.037** 0.052*** 
 (1.89) (-0.48) (2.02) (2.77) 
IO_Advisors -0.074*** -0.050** -0.017* -0.008 
 (-2.66) (-2.29) (-1.82) (-0.96) 
IO_Corporate_Pension_Funds 0.454 0.733*** -0.200 0.040 
 (1.47) (3.49) (-1.60) (0.41) 
IO_Public_Pension_Funds -0.147 -0.033 0.027 -0.018 
 (-1.11) (-0.34) (0.66) (-0.42) 
IO_Universities 1.633** 0.896* -0.364** 0.571*** 
 (2.17) (1.95) (-2.03) (2.67) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 
Adj.R-squared 0.813 0.799 0.810 0.802 
  
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), and its components, asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and 







ownership by different types of institutional investors, bank trusts (IO_Banks), insurance companies (IO_Insurance_Companies), 
investment companies (IO_Investment_Companies), independent investments advisors (IO_Advisors), corporate (private) pension funds 
(IO_Corporate_Pension_Funds), public pension funds (IO_Public_Pension_Funds), university and foundation endowments 
(IO_Universities), where miscellaneous (IO_Miscellaneous) is the base group. Controls include Concentration, Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), 
Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. The sample includes 3,860 banks 
from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and independent variables are lagged one quarter. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 







Table 1.6: Alternative Measure of Institutional Ownership Concentration 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LC(total)/GTA  LC(asset)/GTA  LC (liab)/GTA  LC (off)/GTA  
          
Distraction 0.088*** 0.068*** -0.006 0.018** 
 (3.11) (2.92) (-0.57) (2.08) 
Blockholdership 0.088*** 0.068*** -0.006 0.018** 
 (3.11) (2.92) (-0.57) (2.08) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 
Adj.R-squared 0.812 0.798 0.809 0.801 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), and its components, asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and 
off-balance sheet liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) with an alternative measure of 
institutional investor concentration: blockholder ownership (Blockholdership). Controls include Ownership (%), Ln(GTA), Sqr. 
Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. The sample includes 
3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and independent variables are lagged 
one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical significance at the 














Table 1.7: Controlling for Types of Institutional Investors by Bushee (1998)  
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LC(total)/GTA  LC(asset)/GTA  LC (liab)/GTA  LC (off)/GTA  
          
Distraction 0.087*** 0.066*** -0.006 0.018** 
 (3.06) (2.88) (-0.57) (2.04) 
IO_Dedicated 0.042 0.036* -0.008 0.009 
 (1.56) (1.79) (-1.09) (1.13) 
IO_Quasi-indexers 0.030* 0.032** -0.005 0.006 
 (1.67) (2.41) (-0.68) (1.07) 
IO_Transient -0.057 -0.052** 0.002 -0.006 
 (-1.30) (-1.99) (0.23) (-0.54) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 
Adj.R-squared 0.812 0.798 0.809 0.801 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) controlling for three different types of institutional 
investors defined by Bushee (1998), dedicated (IO_Dedicated), quasi-indexer (IO_Quasi-indexers), transient (IO_Transient). Controls 
include Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. 
The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and independent 
variables are lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical 








Table 1.8: Controlling for Institutional Investor Horizon 
         
  LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC (liab) / GTA LC (off) / GTA 
Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Distraction 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.068*** 0.067*** -0.006 -0.006 0.017** 0.017** 
 (3.02) (3.01) (2.91) (2.89) (-0.63) (-0.62) (1.96) (1.97) 
Churn rate -0.061  -0.008  -0.052  -0.005  
 (-0.51)  (-0.10)  (-1.56)  (-0.14)  
Short-term IO  -0.012  -0.005  -0.008  -0.001 
  (-0.36)  (-0.25)  (-0.98)  (-0.14) 
Long-term IO  0.049**  0.042***  0.007  0.006 
  (2.44)  (2.65)  (0.97)  (0.96) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 
Adj.R-squared 0.812 0.812 0.798 0.798 0.809 0.809 0.801 0.801 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) controlling for institutional investor horizon defined 
by Yan and Zhang (2009) methodology: Odd-numbered columns employ churn rates of institutional investors (Churn rate) whereas 
even-numbered columns employ short-term oriented institutional investor ownership (Short-term IO) and long-term oriented 
institutional investor ownership (Long-term IO). Controls include Ownership(%) (dropped for specifications where Short-term IO and 
Long-term IO are included), Concentration, Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients 
on Controls are omitted for brevity. The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All variables are described in 
Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and independent variables are lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard 








Table 1.9: Normal vs Crises Times and High Versus Low Uncertainty Times 
 
Panel A: Results during normal times and crises times 
Dependent Variables LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC (liab) / GTA LC (off) / GTA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Normal Crises Normal Crises Normal Crises Normal Crises 
         
Distraction 0.079** 0.109*** 0.053** 0.086*** 0.002 -0.004 0.011 0.028*** 
 (2.28) (2.74) (2.00) (2.65) (0.17) (-0.26) (1.06) (2.77) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,768 24,465 45,768 24,465 45,768 24,465 45,768 24,465 
Adj.R-squared 0.818 0.852 0.795 0.848 0.819 0.833 0.814 0.842 
 
Dependent Variables LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC (liab) / GTA LC(off) / GTA 
Chi-square test for 
equality of the 
Distraction coefficients 
across subsamples 








Panel B: Results during low and high uncertainty times 
Dependent Variables LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC (liab) / GTA LC (off) / GTA 


















         
Distraction 0.011 0.140*** 0.008 0.122*** -0.002 -0.010 -0.005 0.028** 
 (0.41) (3.80) (0.38) (3.97) (-0.17) (-0.73) (-0.59) (2.48) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 35,519 34,714 35,519 34,714 35,519 34,714 35,519 34,714 
Adj.R-squared 0.839 0.822 0.828 0.814 0.830 0.825 0.823 0.814 
 
Dependent Variables LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC (liab) / GTA LC(off) / GTA 
Chi-square test for 
equality of the 
Distraction coefficients 
across subsamples 
6,212.69*** 42,335.67*** 10,896.87*** 310,000*** 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) during normal times and crises times as well as high 
versus low uncertainty times. Normal and Crises are dummy variables indicating the sample periods where Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
define as non-crises times and crises times, respectively. Uncertainty is defined as the financial regulation uncertainty by Baker et al. 
(2016). High uncertainty is defined as the above median level of uncertainty in the given sample period whereas low uncertainty states 
the below median. Panel A shows the results during normal times and crises times whereas Panel B displays the results during low and 
high uncertainty times. Controls include Ownership(%), Concentration, Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) 
and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All 







and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and 








Table 1.10: Main Regression Results by Bank Size Classes 
 
Dependent Variables LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC (liab) / GTA LC (off) / GTA 


















         
Distraction 0.074*** 1.530** 0.073*** 1.298** -0.009 0.031 0.009 0.326 
 (2.74) (2.10) (3.13) (2.68) (-0.88) (0.13) (1.05) (1.37) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 62,496 1,205 62,496 1,205 62,496 1,205 62,496 1,205 
Adj.R-squared 0.818 0.889 0.810 0.903 0.820 0.894 0.764 0.611 
 
Dependent Variables LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC (liab) / GTA LC(off) / GTA 
Chi-square test for 
equality of the 
Distraction coefficients 
across subsamples 
33.55*** 432.55*** 37.50*** 932.68*** 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) by bank size classes. Small banks are the banks with 
GTA less than $10 billion according to the definition of Whalen (2013), and Lux and Greene (2015). On the other hand, large banks 
have at least $100 billion of GTA by following the systemically important financial institutions threshold. Controls include Ownership 
(%), Concentration, Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted 
for brevity. The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and 
independent variables are lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank 







Table 1.11: Main Regression Results by Primary Federal Regulator Classes 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LC(total)/GTA  LC(asset)/GTA  LC (liab)/GTA  LC (off)/GTA  
          
Distraction 0.099*** 0.082*** -0.009 0.019* 
 (3.28) (3.29) (-0.79) (1.94) 
FED -0.016 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.47) (-0.10) (0.50) (-0.34) 
FED x Distraction -0.134* -0.109** -0.017 -0.027 
 (-1.82) (-2.12) (-0.55) (-1.09) 
OCC 0.013 -0.004 0.010 0.007 
 (0.55) (-0.22) (1.48) (0.89) 
OCC x Distraction -0.025 -0.053 0.048 0.004 
 (-0.30) (-0.98) (1.49) (0.11) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 
Adj.R-squared 0.812 0.798 0.809 0.801 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) by banks’ primary federal regulators. The Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises the national banks whereas the Federal Reserve System (FED) examines the state-
chartered member banks. The remaining state-chartered non-member banks are regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). FED is a dummy variable that equals to one if the FED is the primary federal regulator of a bank. OCC is a dummy variable 
that equals to one if OCC is the primary federal regulator of a bank. Controls include Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, 
Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 







parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted 







Table 1.12: Alternative Explanation: Corporate Governance Proxies  
 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) controlling for the inverse measures of weak corporate 
governance proxies stated by Bennett et al. (2003). Banks with less institutional ownership (Ownership (%)), less public pension fund 
ownership (IO_Public_Pension_Funds), and less long-term institutional ownership (Long-term IO) are more likely to suffer from agency 
problems. Controls include Ownership (%) (dropped for specifications where Long-term IO and IO_Public_Pension_Funds are 
included), Concentration, Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are 
omitted for brevity. The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 
1.16 and independent variables are lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered 
at bank level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
 LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC(off) / GTA 
  Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Distraction 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.085*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.017** 0.018** 0.017* 
 (3.03) (3.10) (2.96) (2.91) (2.95) (2.86) (1.97) (2.00) (1.95) 
Ownership (%) 0.015   0.017   0.004   
 (0.81)   (1.30)   (0.71)   
IO_Public_Pension_Funds  -0.104   0.016   -0.006  
  (-0.77)   (0.16)   (-0.13)  
Long-term IO   0.048**   0.042***   0.006 
   (2.44)   (2.65)   (0.96) 
          
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 







Table 1.13: Nonlinear Model Specifications 
 
Panel A: Linear-log model specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LC(total)/GTA  LC(asset)/GTA  LC (liab)/GTA  LC (off)/GTA  
          
Ln(Distraction) 0.109*** 0.089*** -0.009 0.021* 
 (3.18) (3.16) (-0.74) (1.95) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 
Adj.R-squared 0.812 0.798 0.809 0.801 
 
Panel B: Quadratic form of nonlinear model specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LC(total)/GTA  LC(asset)/GTA  LC (liab)/GTA  LC (off)/GTA  
          
Distraction 0.174*** 0.179*** -0.034* 0.022 
 (3.40) (3.95) (-1.75) (1.30) 
Sq. Distraction -0.195*** -0.245*** 0.062** -0.010 
 (-3.06) (-3.31) (2.05) (-0.38) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,233 70,233 70,233 70,233 








This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA), asset-side liquidity creation (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation (LC(liab)/GTA), and off-balance sheet 
liquidity creation (LC(off)/GTA) on the natural logarithm of one plus institutional investor distraction (Ln(Distraction)) in Panel A, and 
on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) and its squared term (Sq. Distraction) in Panel B. Controls include Ln(GTA), Sqr. 
Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. The sample includes 
3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and independent variables are lagged 
one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical significance at the 









Table 1.14: Institutional Investor Distraction on Nonperforming Loans Ratio 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables (NPL/TL)t+1 (NPL/TL)t+2 (NPL/TL)t+3 (NPL/TL)t+4 
          
Distraction -0.007 0.012* 0.014** 0.014* 
 (-1.47) (1.96) (2.21) (1.73) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 65,365 62,767 59,601 56,601 
Adj.R-squared 0.523 0.613 0.699 0.751 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of nonperforming loans ratio (NPL/TL) on institutional investor distraction 
(Distraction) up to four quarters after a distracted period. Controls include Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, Ln(Population) 
and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. The sample includes 3,860 banks from 1986:Q1 through 2016:Q4. All 
variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16 and independent variables are lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses 











Table 1.15: Controlling for Various Internal Governance Mechanisms 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Governance Index (G-Index)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC(liab) / GTA LC(off) / GTA 
          
Distraction 0.283** 0.269*** -0.050 0.074* 
 (2.04) (2.91) (-0.99) (1.76) 
G-Index 0.002 0.005* -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.51) (1.68) (-0.42) (-0.45) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,630 7,630 7,630 7,630 




















Panel B: Controlling for Entrenchment Index (E-Index)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables LC(total) / GTA LC(asset) / GTA LC(liab) / GTA LC(off) / GTA 
          
Distraction 0.277* 0.278*** -0.073 0.069 
 (1.82) (2.78) (-1.27) (1.38) 
E-Index 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.002 0.004* 
 (5.43) (5.03) (0.83) (1.81) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,554 7,554 7,554 7,554 
Adj.R-squared 0.859 0.852 0.812 0.842 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA) on institutional investor distraction (Distraction) controlling for the various internal governance mechanisms. Panel A 
displays the results controlling for Governance Index (G-Index), developed by Gompers et al. (2003), which inversely measures the 
level of shareholder rights in a given firm. Panel B shows the results controlling for Entrenchment Index (E-Index), developed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009), which is a proxy for managerial power. Controls include Ln(GTA), Sqr. Ln(GTA), Capital ratio, HHI, 
Ln(Population) and Tobin’s Q. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. All variables are described in Tables 1.1 and 1.16. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 







Table 1.16: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables  
  
LC(total)/GTA Total liquidity creation measure of a bank as the sum of on- and off-balance sheet 
activities normalized by a bank’s gross total assets: LC(total)/GTA = LC(asset)/GTA 
+ LC(liab)/GTA + LC(off)/GTA.  
LC(asset)/GTA Asset-side liquidity creation measure of a bank. It is defined as (-1/2)×all items of 
liquid assets + (+1/2)×all items of illiquid assets normalized by the gross total assets 
of a bank. Items that are considered as liquid and illiquid assets are displayed in Table 
1.1.  
LC(liab)/GTA Liability-side liquidity creation measure of a bank. It is defined as (+1/2)×all liquid 
liabilities + (-1/2) )×all items of illiquid liabilities plus equity normalized by the gross 
total assets of a bank. Items that are considered as liquid liabilities are displayed in 
Table 1.1. 
LC(off)/GTA Off-balance sheet-side liquidity creation measure of a bank. It is defined as (+1/2)×all 
items of illiquid guarantees + (-1/2)×(all items of liquid guarantees + liquid 
derivatives) normalized by the gross total assets of a bank. Items that are considered 
as liquid derivatives, liquid, and illiquid guarantees are displayed in Table 1.1.  
Key independent variable  
  
Distraction Definition of distracted institutional investors by Kempf et al. (2017). This measure 
relies on whether an attention-grabbing shock occur in other industries, whether 
institutional investors consider this shock as important, and whether affected 
institutional investors are significant monitors of a specific firm. This distraction 
measure is an inverse measure of monitoring intensity executed to a firm at a given 













Ownership (%) Institutional investor ownership is the fraction of a bank’s shares held by institutional 
investors relative to total shares outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter.  
Concentration Concentration of institutional ownership is the Herfindahl index of the investor 
weights of a bank. The weight of an investor for a given bank is calculated as an 
investor’s share in that bank stock in the pool of all institutional investors in a given 
year-quarter.   
Ln(GTA)  The natural logarithm of gross total assets (GTA) is employed as a proxy for bank 
size. GTA of a bank is defined as the sum of total asset, allowance for loan and lease 
losses, and allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans) in 
$billion.  
Capital ratio  The total equity capital defined as the proportion of gross total assets (GTA) of a 
bank.  
HHI  Competition measure of a bank computed as the weighted average of the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index in all areas where a bank operates. Areas are defined as 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) if included in MSA, or counties, otherwise. 
Proportion of deposits in each area is employed as weights.  
Ln(Population) Population index of a bank computed as the natural logarithm of a weighted average 
of the population (in millions) in all areas where a bank operates. Proportion of 
deposits in each area is employed as weights.  
Tobin’s Q  Bank-level index of firms’ Tobin’s Q calculated as follows: First, firm-level 
normalized Tobin’s Q is calculated, which is defined as a firm’s Tobin’s Q in quarter 
t divided by one quarter lagged total asset of firms in the Compustat data whose 
headquarters are in the corresponding state. Tobin's Q is calculated as the ratio of 
market value of assets to the book value of assets (Compustat Item 6). Market value 
of assets is the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock 
less the sum of the book value of common stock (Compustat Item 60) and balance 
sheet deferred taxes (Compustat Item 74). Second, state-level index is computed as 







Finally, bank-level index is computed as the weighted average of state-level index, 
where weights depend on the proportion of deposits in each state.  
Variables for robustness checks  
  
Blockholdership Institutional investor blockholder ownership is the fraction of a bank’s shares held 
by institutional investors as blockholders relative to total shares outstanding of a 
specific bank at a given year-quarter.  
IO_Banks Institutional ownership fraction held by bank trusts relative to total shares 
outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter. 
IO_Insurance_Companies Institutional ownership fraction held by insurance companies relative to total shares 
outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter. 
IO_Investment_Companies Institutional ownership fraction held by investment companies relative to total shares 
outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter. 
IO_Advisors Institutional ownership fraction held by independent investment advisors relative to 
total shares outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter. 
IO_Corporate_Pension_Funds Institutional ownership fraction held by corporate (private) pension funds relative to 
total shares outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter.  
IO_Public_Pension_Funds Institutional ownership fraction held by public pension funds relative to total shares 
outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter.  
IO_Universities Institutional ownership fraction held by university and foundation endowments 
relative to total shares outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter.  
IO_Miscellaneous Institutional ownership fraction held by miscellaneous relative to total shares 
outstanding of a specific bank at a given year-quarter. This is employed as the base 
group in the analysis.  
IO_Dedicated Dedicated institutional investor ownership is the fraction of a bank stock held at a 
given year-quarter by dedicated institutional investors who typically concentrate on 
only few firms by holding large stakes at long-term horizon given their low portfolio 
turnover. Dedicated institutional investors are defined by following the methodology 
of Bushee (1998).  
IO_Quasi-indexers Quasi-indexer institutional investor ownership is the fraction of a bank stock held at 







of diversification with a low portfolio turnover. Quasi-indexer institutional investors 
are defined by following the methodology of Bushee (1998). 
IO_Transient Transient institutional investor is the fraction of a bank stock held at a given year-
quarter by transient institutional investors who hold small shares in several firms and 
trade their stocks frequently which leads to a short-term investment horizon. 
Transient institutional investors are defined by following the methodology of Bushee 
(1998).  
Churn rate Churn rates of institutional investors following the methodology of Yan and Zhang 
(2009). 
Short-term IO Short-term oriented institutional investor ownership is the fraction of a bank stock 
held at a given year-quarter by short-term oriented institutional investors who have 
high portfolio turnover. Short-term institutional investors are defined by following 
the methodology of Yan and Zhang (2009). 
Long-term IO Long-term oriented institutional investor ownership is the fraction of a bank stock 
held at a given year-quarter by long-term oriented institutional investors who have 
low portfolio turnover. Long-term institutional investors are defined by following the 
methodology of Yan and Zhang (2009). 
Variables for channels  
  
Cash/GTA  Cash and balances due from other depository institutions divided by the gross total 
assets (GTA) of a bank.  
Securities/GTA  Securities divided by the gross total assets (GTA) of a bank. 
Loans/GTA  Total loans divided by the gross total assets (GTA) of a bank. 
Deposits/GTA  Deposits divided by the gross total assets (GTA) of a bank.  
Loan cmt./GTA  Loan commitments divided by the gross total assets (GTA) of a bank. 
  
Variables for subsamples  
  
Size class  Size categories of banks are small and large. Small banks are defined as the banks 
with less than $10 billion of gross total assets by following Whalen (2013) and Lux 







billion of gross total assets according to the designation of systemically important 
financial institutions.  
Crises vs normal times Normal and Crises are dummy variables indicating the sample periods where Berger 
and Bouwman (2013) define as non-crises times and crises times, respectively. 
High vs low uncertainty High uncertainty times are the time periods when financial regulation uncertainty by 
Baker et al. (2016) is above the sample median whereas low uncertainty times are the 
time periods when it is below the sample median.  
Variables for further analyses  
 
NPL/TL Nonperforming loans ratio is the ratio of nonperforming assets and assets in default 
in total loans. Noncurrent loans and leases are those that are past due for at least 90 
days or are no longer accruing interest. A higher nonperforming loans ratio indicates 
lower asset quality for a bank.   
G-Index Governance Index (G-Index) is an inverse measure of shareholder rights (or a 
measure of managerial power) in a given firm, developed by Gompers et al. (2003).  
E-Index Entrenchment Index (E-Index) is a proxy for managerial power, developed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
  
This table presents definitions of variables, including the dependent and key independent variables, control variables, variables for 




CHAPTER 2: BANKING POWERS AND BANK LIQUIDITY 
CREATION5
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Banking regulators at the national level license banks and specify the permissible 
activities they can engage in. While some countries may restrict banks to a narrow range 
of activities confined to the traditional commercial banking such as lending and deposit 
taking, others may provide banks with more power by allowing them to engage in a broad 
array of non-traditional activities widened to investment banking activities such as 
securities underwriting and even beyond through insurance underwriting and real estate 
investments. The differences in the scope of banking activities across countries may have 
substantial impacts on the risk-return tradeoff of banking activities (Agoraki, Delis, and 
Pasiouras, 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010), international bank flows (Houston, 
Lin, and Ma 2012), cross-border bank acquisitions (Karolyi and Taboada, 2015), bank 
efficiency (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010), and bank risk-taking (Gonzalez, 2005; 
Ongena, Popov, and Udell, 2013). However, how these differences between the levels of 
banking powers across countries affect bank liquidity creation, one of the key functions of 
banks, is untapped.  
 
 




According to the contemporary financial intermediation theory, one of the main 
roles of banks in the economy is to create liquidity by financing illiquid assets such as loans 
with liquid liabilities such as deposits (e.g., Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Boyd and 
Prescott, 1986; Bryant, 1980; Diamond, 1984; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Ramakrishnan 
and Thakor, 1984). Furthermore, banks create off-balance sheet liquidities, such as loan 
commitments and similar claims to liquid funds (e.g. Holmström and Tirole, 1998; 
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002). These financial intermediation functions play a vital role 
in the economy. More specifically, banks connect illiquid investment opportunities of 
entrepreneurs with short-term funds of depositors, and therefore, increase economic 
activity that in turn leads to economic growth (e.g., Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002). 
Berger and Sedunov (2017) provide empirical evidence that more bank liquidity creation 
is associated with higher real economic output.  
Given the importance of bank liquidity creation for the nonbank public such as 
firms and households and the real economy, this paper investigates whether more banking 
powers may lead to higher bank output. The vast literature on universal banking built up 
with the debate reinitiated by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 puts forward two 
contrasting impacts of banking powers on bank liquidity creation. The certification view 
suggests that the informational economies of scale and scope along with cost and revenue 
efficiencies gained after combining different banking powers may yield to continuity and 
expansion of relationships between banks and their clients in the future. (Benston, 1990; 
Drucker and Puri, 2005; Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995; Saunders and Walter, 1994). 
Therefore, banking powers may create a synergy and boost the bank output by 




banks, or insurance companies, or real estate investment trusts (Abedifar, Molyneux, and 
Tarazi, 2018; Puri, 1999). For instance, a specific firm-bank pair with an already issued 
loan may also engage in potential future businesses such as real estate, insurance, securities 
dealing, or even another loan (Drucker and Puri, 2005). 
On the other hand, the conflict of interest view suggests that firms and their 
shareholders with a close relationship to banks may become aware of the misuse of banks’ 
lending power and informational advantage or simply may not trust in the expertise of 
banks in non core banking activities and thus, hinder joint future businesses. (Kang and 
Liu, 2007; Puri, 1996; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). For example, information-
misrepresentation conflict points out that banks may exert influence on low quality firms 
to underwrite their public securities and use the corresponding proceeds to pay back their 
loans (Puri, 1999; Saunders, 1985) or surcharge the underwriting fees (Puri, 1999).  
The net effect of these two contrasting predictions on how banking powers may 
affect bank liquidity creation is unclear and is the focus of this study. We start our analysis 
using a modified version of bank liquidity creation measures as in Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) and Berger, Boubakri, Guedhami, and Li (2019). More specifically, we construct 
the measures of liquidity creation for commercial banks among 85 countries from 2000 to 
2014. As our main explanatory variable (Banking Powers), we employ the (additive) 
inverse measure of the overall restrictions index on banking activities from World Bank 
surveys on banking regulation. Components of this index used in the analyses measure the 
degree to which banks may engage in the following (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013): (1) 
securities activities (Secur_power), which refer to securities underwriting, brokering, 




which involve insurance underwriting and selling; and (3) real estate activities 
(Real_power), which refer to real estate investment, development, and management. 
By way of preview, we find that banking powers increase bank liquidity creation in 
the same country. The results are also economically significant – a one-standard-deviation 
increase in Banking Powers produces a 1.513 increase in total bank liquidity creation from 
the mean of 52.315, a 2.891% increase. Our results are robust to a variety of other checks 
after controlling for additional bank regulations, additional country macro conditions, and 
additional institution variables, subsample analysis, and subcomponent analysis.  
As noted in the literature, home country banking powers may affect foreign 
subsidiaries by impacting bank balance sheets (e.g., De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010; Peek 
and Rosengren, 1997, 2000). Therefore, we also investigate the effect of a bank’s home 
country banking powers on liquidity creation by its foreign subsidiaries in the host country. 
In these specifications, we include host country × year fixed effects, which essentially 
control for demand and supply factors within the host country at an annual frequency. We 
find that higher banking powers in home country decrease bank liquidity creation of foreign 
subsidiaries in the host country. It indicates that banks transfer their liquidity from the low 
banking powers countries to high banking powers countries. These results are supportive 
for international regulatory arbitrage in the financial services industry.  
Our paper contributes to three lines of studies in the literature. First, it adds to the 
viewpoints shaped about the universal banking debate by examining the effects of 
combining different banking powers under one financial institution. Especially after the 
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealing the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States, many 




nontraditional commercial banking activities affected bank riskiness (Abedifar et al., 2018; 
Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Boyd et al., 1993; Deacle & Elyasiani, 2014; DeYoung & Torna, 
2013; Filson & Olfati, 2014; Köhler, 2014; Köhler, 2015; Nurullah & Staikouras, 2008; 
Rosen et al., 1989; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh, 2006), bank performance (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; 
Deacle & Elyasiani, 2014; Filson & Olfati, 2014; Johnston & Madura, 2000; Köhler, 2015; 
Mei & Saunders, 1997; Stiroh & Rumble, 2006), build up of systemically important banks 
(Altunbas et al., 2017; Saunders & Walter, 2012; Walter, 2012), and potential conflicts of 
interest between agents in the financial markets (Drucker & Puri, 2005; Fecht et al., 2018; 
Kanatas & Qi, 1998; Kang & Liu, 2007; Kroszner & Rajan, 1994; Puri, 1996; Puri, 1999).  
Second line of literature that our paper adds to is the empirical research of bank 
liquidity creation that occurs in mainly two strands. Some researchers focus on the 
determinants of bank liquidity creation, such as bank governance, capital, CEO 
characteristics, competition, deposit insurance, mergers and acquisitions, regulatory 
intervention, trust, and different bank types (e.g., Bawazir, Degl’innocenti, & Wolfe, 2018; 
Berger, Boubakri, et al., 2019; Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Berger et al., 2016; Berger et 
al., 2021; Berger, Guedhami, et al., 2019; Berger, Li, Saheruddin, et al., 2020; Díaz & 
Huang, 2017; Fungáčová et al., 2017; Fungáčová & Weill, 2012; Horváth et al., 2014, 2016; 
Huang et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2019; Lei & Song, 2013; Pana et al., 2010). Other 
researchers focus on the implication of bank liquidity creation on the real economy, such 
as predicting GDP growth, financial crisis, recession, and financial instability (Berger, 





As the third line of literature, we contribute to the international regulatory arbitrage 
with our results on addressing the endogeneity concerns (Houston et al., 2012; Ongena et 
al., 2013). Low banking powers at home may reduce the bank’s incentives to engage in 
risk-taking behavior in its primary domestic market and embark on a deliberate strategy of 
risk-taking abroad to ‘‘make up’’ for the inability to engage in risk-taking in their home-
country market when regulators can also impose restrictions on various non-core bank 
activities (Powell & Majnoni, 2007; Ongena et al., 2013).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review 
of the related literature. In Section 2.3, we describe our data and empirical methodology. 
Section 2.4 present our empirical results, and Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The vast literature on universal banking established especially after the 1999 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealing the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States implies two 
contrasting predictions on the effect of banking powers on bank liquidity creation.  
The first hypothesis represents the certification view stating that more banking 
powers may lead to an increase in bank liquidity creation. The advocates of this effect rely 
mainly on the informational scale and scope of economies created by banks since they may 
take advantage of the proprietary private information about a firm that they lend to 
(Saunders, 1999) thanks to their previous efforts on screening and monitoring (Acharya & 
Johnson, 2007; Ivashina & Sun, 2011; Puri, 1999). The lending relationship over years 
between a bank and a firm may create this informational advantage. In other words, banks 
may reuse their private information about the firm with a cost advantage when they would 




of financial services to them (economies of scope) (Benston, 1990; Bharath et al., 2007; 
Saunders & Walter, 1994; Saunders & Walter, 2012). In these ways, banks may become 
better certifiers of a firm’s expected cash flows and thus its value than stand-alone 
investment banks, insurance companies, and real estate investment trusts. This 
informational advantage eventually leads to cost and revenue efficiency of a bank (Bharath 
et al., 2007; Drucker & Puri, 2005; Greenbaum & Thakor, 1995; Saunders & Walter, 2012). 
Due to the cost efficiency and certification advantage, banks may offer discounted prices 
for the bundles of different financial services and cross-sell them to the firms that banks 
had relationship lending. Also, banks may have the chance to allocate the fixed costs of 
information gathering across multiple financial service activities by cross-selling and thus, 
gain extra revenues (Bharath et al., 2007; Saunders & Walter, 2012; Stiroh & Rumble, 
2006). Banks may become more effective monitors of the firms due to better informational 
flow across several lines of businesses with them (Filson & Olfati, 2014; Gertner et al., 
1994). For instance, Johnston and Madura (2000) report a positive stock price response for 
merger announcements between commercial banks, insurance companies, and brokerage 
firms, documenting the advantages of cross‐selling and efficiencies after such mergers. 
Furthermore, information advantage of banks may mitigate information asymmetry that 
the firms face when they are in need of more capital (Kang & Liu, 2007). In this way, 
universal banks may have an advantage over decreasing the costs of financial distress over 
stand-alone financial institutions (Diamond, 1991; Fama, 1985; Hoshi et al., 1991; 
Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984; Sharpe, 1990). 
Firms as the borrowers from these banks may prefer to engage in new types of 




contracting costs (Klemperer & Padilla, 1997; Saunders & Walter, 2012). For instance, 
Drucker and Puri (2005) show that firms take advantage of the lower underwriting fee 
compared to that of stand-alone investment banks and lower yield spreads on their loans 
when they borrow from the banks that engage in both lending and securities underwriting.  
Therefore, these advantages may translate into not only new types of businesses but 
also the continuation of relationship lending between banks and firms (Bharath et al., 2007; 
Drucker & Puri, 2005; Greenbaum & Thakor, 1995). For example, Bharath et al. (2007) 
show that a relationship lender may provide a new loan in the future to a particular firm 
with a probability of 42% whereas a non-relationship lender’s corresponding probability is 
only 3%. Furthermore, relationship lenders have higher chances to be the provider of debt 
and equity underwriting services to those firms. Nurullah and Staikouras (2008) document 
that European banks gain synergies when they expand into insurance brokerage activities 
without further increasing their return volatility and risk.  
In light of these arguments, we form our first hypothesis as below: 
H1a: Higher banking powers predict an increase in bank liquidity creation, ceteris 
paribus.  
On the other hand, the conflict of interest view suggests that banks may misuse 
their lending power and informational advantage when they expand their relationship with 
firms into non-core banking activities such as underwriting and insurance (Kang & Liu, 
2007; Puri, 1996; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). For instance, there could be a information-
misrepresentation type of conflict, which occurs when banks force low quality firms to 
issue securities and using their underwriting proceeds to repay firms’ loans especially in 




The other impact of this conflict is that banks may charge these low quality firms a high 
underwriting fee (Puri, 1999). Puri (1999) document that due to these conflicts, the 
certification advantage of banks over stand-alone investment banks in securities 
underwriting reported by Puri (1996) is hindered when banks hold firms’ equity claims that 
they underwrite.  
Another type of conflict may arise due to the misselling of low quality securities 
that the banks hold or underwrite to their relationship lending firms (Rajan, 1992; Saunders, 
1999). Further misselling conflict may occur between the bank and its retail customers due 
to the combined services of proprietary trading and retail banking (Fecht et al., 2018). 
Banks may have incentives to take advantage of their unsophisticated retail customers by 
advertising the stocks that they sell from their portfolios in order to reduce the negative 
price impact of specific stock on their portfolios. Fecht et al. (2018) document that retail 
customers of German banks experienced a lower stock return on their portfolios when their 
banks have a proprietary trading desk compared to the case when they do not have such 
desks under the same roof. The underlying reason is the observation that the customers buy 
the stocks that their banks sell and these transactions incur trading losses meanwhile their 
banks make profit from them. The next type of conflict of interest, which is between bond 
issuing firms and their underwriting banks, is reported in Japan by Kand and Liu (2007). 
This study shows that banks underwrite these corporate bonds at a substantially discounted 
price in order to attract more investors and build their own clientele.   
Some argue against expanding banking powers into especially securities dealing in 
the presence of safety net protections for the banks (Kareken & Wallace, 1978; Merton, 




and borrowers and between lenders and deposit insurers are strengthened under the 
universal banking system. The reason is that banks may actually invest in risky negative 
net present value projects due to the moral hazard incentives caused by these protections. 
Also, when banks hold shares and thus, have a control over the firm thanks to the securities 
dealing and may potentially increase firm’s leverage by lending to the firm, these risky 
negative net present value projects might be financed in a risky way. Furthermore, due to 
the lack of expertise of bank in the firm’s industry, banks’ distortion of incentives may 
spillover on to other non-financial industries (Boyd, 1999).  
Another type of reasoning underlying the conflict of interest view is that firms may 
not prefer to engage in non-core banking activities with their lenders since traditional 
commercial banks may lack the necessary expertise in these types of activities. Imperfect 
information of banks with the information asymmetry between the banks and the firms’ 
expertise may lead to higher level of potential agency costs for these firms due to the above 
mentioned conflict of interests (Saunders & Walter, 2012). For instance, Deacle and 
Elyasiani (2014) report that the lack of expertise of the U.S. bank holding companies in 
real estate investments led to a decrease in diversification benefits. Similarly, Mei and 
Saunders (1997) find evidence that U.S. financial institutions have poor performance in 
real estate investment since they have a poor investment strategy of trend-chasing behavior, 
which is not the case with real estate investment trusts that are experts in this field. 
Therefore, Rosen et al. (1989) suggest that higher real estate investments may cause an 
increase in bank risk rather than a decrease.  
Boyd et al. (1993) report that the mergers of bank holding companies with securities 




property/casualty insurance firms may lead to lower risk. On the other hand, Nurullah and 
Staikouras (2008) report that European banks expanding into life and non-life insurance 
underwriting activities experience higher bank risks due to the capital intensive nature of 
insurance underwriting and bancassurance requiring the knowledge of risks specific to the 
insurance services.  
Related to this lack of expertise line of reasoning for banks, there are some related 
studies on how banks’ expansion into noninterest income activities has affected their risk-
return profiles. The general argument in the literature is that banks’ expansion into 
noninterest income activities such as trading and insurance activities creates higher revenue 
volatility and insolvency risk without necessarily increasing their average return and thus, 
placing them in a worse position in the risk-return frontier (Allen & Jagtiani, 2000; 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; DeYoung & Roland, 2001; Köhler, 2014; Stiroh, 2004; 
Stiroh, 2006). Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that for the financial holding companies in 
the United States, benefits of revenue diversification are dominated by the volatility costs 
of increased noninterest income activities. Moreover, their cross-selling may reduce the 
diversification benefits by increasing their exposure to the same kinds of financial shocks 
(Stiroh, 2004). DeYoung and Torna (2013) find that banks with significant amounts of 
investment banking, venture capital, and proprietary trading activities are also inclined to 
take more risk in their traditional banking activities. They tend to hold less diversified and 
riskier loan portfolios, and finance them with less stable deposits. Allen and Jagtiani (2000) 
note that banks become riskier systematically as their exposure to securities and insurance 
activities increases. Brunnermeier et al. (2020) also show that systemic risk contributions 




As suggested by Saunders and Walter (2012), these revenue diseconomies of scope 
may be realized due to management complexities and conflicts of interest. Kroszner and 
Rajan (1994) report that the conflicts that may potentially come up among the bank 
affiliates may have discounted by the rational participants of the markets. Therefore, firms 
and their shareholders may become aware of these types of conflicts and may restrict the 
future businesses with those banks, which may in turn lead to lower bank liquidity creation.  
All these arguments may lead to a decrease in bank liquidity creation when there 
are more banking powers.  
In light of these arguments, we build our second hypothesis as below: 
H1b: Higher banking powers predict a decrease in bank liquidity creation, ceteris 
paribus.  
2.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To construct the liquidity creation measure for each bank, we follow Berger and 
Bouwman’s (2009) three-step procedure modified by Berger, Boubakri, et al. (2019). The 
bank-level financial data are collected from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. 
We only use bank’s unconsolidated financial statements and to ensure that banks have 
detailed financial information, we also exclude banks without key financial information. 
In the first step, we classify all bank activities (assets, liabilities, equity, and off-
balance sheet activities) as liquidity, semi-liquidity, or illiquidity depending on the 
information on product category. Following Berger, Boubakri, et al. (2019), we take into 
consideration the fact that countries have different levels of development in their capital 
markets. We assume that high income (low income) countries have better (less) developed 




that are classified as semiliquid assets in high income countries may classify as illiquid 
assets in low income countries.6 In the second step, we assign weights to all bank activities 
that are classified in the first step. To be consistent with the liquidity creation theory, which 
documents that banks create liquidity on the balance sheet when they transform illiquid 
assets into liquid liabilities, we assign positive weights to illiquid assets and liquid 
liabilities. Negative weights are placed on liquid assets and illiquid liabilities since banks 
destroy liquidity by employing illiquid assets to finance liquidity liabilities. We use weights 
of 1/2, 0, -1/2 since only half of the total amount of liquidity creation is attributable to the 
source or use of funds alone. In the third step, we combine the activities that are classified 
in the first step and the weights assigned to them in the second step to construct Berger and 
Bouwman’s (2009) preferred liquidity creation measure – “cat fat”. The "cat fat" is a 
measure which includes both on- and off-balance sheet activities and their preferred 
measure of bank liquidity among their four different liquidity creation measures. In order 
to calculate the dollar amount of liquidity creation at a particular bank, we multiply the 
signs of 1/2, 0, -1/2, with the dollar amount of the corresponding bank activities and sum 
the weighted dollar amounts. The detail is shown in Table 2.1. 
Our main explanatory variable is banking powers (Banking Powers), which is the 
(additive) inverse measure of the overall restrictions index on banking activities gathered 
from World Bank surveys on banking regulation. This tool measures the degree to which 
national regulations allow banks to engage in the following (Barth et al., 2013): (1) 
securities activities (Secur_power), which refer to securities underwriting, brokering, 
 
 
6 For example, residential mortgage loans are classified as semi-liquid assets in high 




dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry; (2) insurance activities (Insur_power), 
which involve insurance underwriting and selling; and (3) real estate activities 
(Real_power), which refer to real estate investment, development, and management. Each 
of the index values for securities, insurance, and real estate range from -1 to -4, where 
larger absolute values indicate lower banking powers of banks to perform each activity. In 
particular, in absolute terms, 4 signifies no banking powers due to prohibited activities, 3 
indicates a very low banking powers since there are tight restrictions on the provision of 
the activity, 2 implies a high amount of banking powers because the activity is permitted 
but with some limits, and 1 signals banking powers employed to the fullest as activity is 
permitted.  
We merge bank liquidity creation data with banking powers data, and further merge 
country level macroeconomic data from World Development Indicator (WDI), 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), country level 
regulation data from the World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey Database. The 
full sample contains 141,537 bank-year observations from 2000 to 2014 across 85 
countries. Across all countries, the U.S. has the highest number of observations and 
Cameroon has the least. We present the sample distribution by country in Table 2.10.  
To test the hypotheses, we estimate OLS regressions for the full bank sample with 
the following specification: 
𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + ɤ′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 (1) 
where 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the ratio of bank liquidity creation/gross total assets using the prefered “cat 
fat” measure based on Berger and Bouwman (2009) for bank 𝑖 in country 𝑗 in year 𝑡, and 




well as foreign subsidiaries. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 is the inverse measure of overall 
restrictions index on banking activities in country 𝑗 in year 𝑡 − 1, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 is the vector 
of control variables in year 𝑡 − 1, 𝛼 is the common intercept, 𝜏𝑡−1 is the year fixed effects, 
𝑏𝑖 is bank fixed effects, and 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 is the error term. We use the clustered the robust 
standard errors at the country level to mitigate potential confounding effects of 
heteroskedasticity.  
We control a broad set of country and bank level control variables that may also 
affect bank liquidity creation to avoid the potential issue of omitted variable bias. We also 
lag all control variables one year to attenuate the potential reverse causality with the 
dependent variable.7 Following prior research on bank liquidity creation in an international 
context, we control for several country characteristics. First, we control for indicators of 
economic development, including the rate of growth in the country’s real gross domestic 
product (GDP) (Growth), the lending interest rate (Interest), the rate of inflation (Inflation), 
the GDP per capita (GDP per capita), the existence of the country’s deposit insurance 
scheme (Deposit Insurance). At bank level, we first control for bank size (Ln (GTA)), by 
including the natural logarithm of banks’ gross total assets. Second, we control for bank 
capital ratio (Capital Ratio), defined as the bank’s total equity divided by gross total assets. 
Capital is a valuable tool to assess the safety and soundness of banking organizations and 
is used here as a measure of bank risk-taking. According to the “financial fragility-
crowding out” hypothesis, higher capital could reduce bank liquidity creation (Diamond & 
Rajan, 2000, 2001; Gorton & Winton, 2017). Alternatively, the “risk absorption” 
 
 




hypothesis indicate that higher capital improves bank’s ability to create liquidity (Allen & 
Gale, 2004b; Allen & Santomero, 1997; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). Third, we control 
for the overhead ratio (Overhead), defined as the ratio of overhead cost to total asset. High 
overhead costs (proxy for management inefficiency) may favor a low bank liquidity 
creation. Complete definitions of all variables used in this paper are shown in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.3 provides summary statistics for the full sample. The mean of the ratio of 
total liquidity creation to gross total assets (LC(Total)/GTA) is 52.315, which means banks 
create 52.315% of the gross total assets (GTA) on average. Our key independent variable 
(Banking Powers) is with the mean of 4.024. In addition, we also discuss how banks 
respond to the lower banking powers, and allocate their resources among different 
countries. We construct a subsample with only foreign bank subsidiaries in which the 
bank’s home country is determined by the source country of ownership using Claessens 
and Van Horen’s (2015) bank ownership database. The final sample contains 5794 bank-
year observations from 2000 to 2014 across 85 countries.  
2.4 RESULTS 
This section shows the baseline results of banking powers on bank liquidity creation 
across different countries. The banking powers and bank liquidity creation are also further 
decomposed, and their correlations are checked.  
Table 2.4 presents the results of our baseline analysis. The dependent variable in 
column (1) to column (4) is total bank liquidity creation normalized by gross total assets 
(LC(total)/GTA). The key independent variable in column (1) to column (4) is banking 
powers (Banking Powers), which is the inverse measure of overall restrictions index on 




include our key independent variable, banking powers (Banking Powers). We add 
macroeconomic controls in column (2) and bank regulation and competition control in 
column (3). We further add bank-level controls in column (4). Across all regressions, we 
include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. All controls are lagged one year to avoid potential endogeneity concerns. 
Across all regressions, we consistently find that banking powers index (Banking 
Powers) in a country is positively and statistically significantly associated with total 
liquidity creation of banks in that country, including the domestic banks as well as foreign 
subsidiaries. Results are also economically significant. Based on the full specification in 
column (4), we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in Banking Powers produces a 
1.513 increase in total bank liquidity creation from the mean of 52.315, a 2.891% increase. 
Turning to the controls, Ln (GTA) is positively associated with bank liquidity creation, 
consistent with prior bank liquidity creation studies (e.g., Berger & Bouwman, 2009). The 
capital ratio (Capital Ratio) is negatively associated with bank liquidity creation, consistent 
with prior bank liquidity creation studies (e.g., Berger, Boubakri, et al., 2019; Horváth et 
al., 2014), and supports “financial fragility-crowding out” theory (Berger & Bouwman, 
2009; Diamond & Rajan, 2000). 
Table 2.5 presents the results of the regressions of banking powers on the 
subcomponents of bank liquidity creation. In this table, we decompose the total bank 
liquidity creation (LC(total)/GTA) into three components: Asset-side liquidity creation 
normalized by GTA (LC(asset)/GTA), liability-side liquidity creation normalized by GTA 
(LC(liability)/GTA), and off balance sheet-side liquidity creation normalized by GTA 




The dependent variable in column (2) is LC(asset)/GTA, which measures bank liquidity 
created through activities on the asset of the bank balance sheet. The dependent variable in 
column (3) is LC(liability)/GTA, which measures bank liquidity created through both 
liability and equity activities. The dependent variable in column (4) is LC(off)/GTA, which 
measures bank liquidity created through off-balance sheet activities. Across columns (1)–
(4), we find that the coefficients of Banking Powers in columns (1), (2), and (4) are 
significantly positive, which suggests that our main effect is mainly through bank liquidity 
created by the asset activities and off-balance sheet activities. Based on the full model 
specification, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in Banking Powers produces 
6.776% and 10.180% increases in asset-side and off balance sheet-side liquidity creation 
from their averages, respectively. 
In previous results, we consistently find that Banking Powers continues to be 
negatively statistically significantly related to total bank liquidity creation (LC(total)/GTA). 
In Table 2.6, we decompose Banking Powers index into three subcomponents and 
investigate the effect of elements of Banking Powers index on total bank liquidity creation. 
These three subcomponents measure the degree to which national regulations allow banks 
to engage in the following (Barth et al., 2013): (1) securities activities (Secur_power), 
which refer to securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual 
fund industry; (2) insurance activities (Insur_power), which involve insurance 
underwriting and selling; and (3) real estate activities (Real_power), which refer to real 
estate investment, development, and management. In Table 2.6, the results indicate that the 




Table 2.7 illustrates subsample analysis. We exclude several potential outliers to 
ensure that they have no significant effects on our results. We include the full sample results 
on column (4) of Table 2.4 as comparison to column (1). In columns (2) and (3), we divide 
the sample into high-income and low-income countries. In column (4), we exclude the 
United States, which is the country with the highest number of observations. We exclude 
Honduras, which has the highest liquidity creation in column (5), and Russia, which has 
the lowest liquidity creation in column (6). We also exclude Uganda, which has the lowest 
banking powers score in column (7) and the Hong Kong, which has the highest banking 
powers score in column (8). Across columns (1)–(8), results show highly negative 
significant coefficients, which suggests that corresponding outliers do not affect our main 
results. It supports the view that more banking powers leads to higher bank liquidity 
creation.  
In Table 2.8, we control for the additional factors, which may affect bank liquidity 
creation following the previous studies in the literature (e.g., Berger et al., 2021; Berger, 
Li, and Saheruddin, et al., 2020; Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). We include trade 
balance as a percentage of GDP (Trade) in column (2), budget balance as percentage of 
GDP (Budget) in column (3), the quantity of M2 level of money supply in column (4). In 
column (5), we include capital regulation (Capital Regulation), which measures the amount 
of capital banks must hold and the stringency of regulations on the nature and source of 
regulatory capital. In columns (6) and (7), we control for additional country-level 
institution variables, corruption (Corruption), and law and order (Law and Order). The 
Corruption measure is from the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) corruption 




system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the 
economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business 
by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; 
and, last but not least, introduces an inherent instability into the political process.” The 
Law and Order measure is also from ICRG and captures the strength of the country’s legal 
system and the extent to which the citizens are willing to rely on established institutions to 
make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. We continue to find that Banking 
Powers is positively associated with bank liquidity creation after including these additional 
controls.  
The above estimates illustrate that the banking powers significantly increase the 
bank liquidity creation, which may affect profitability. Thus, rational managers of banks 
could allocate their resources strategically. If a bank owns a foreign subsidiary in a host 
country where the banking powers are relatively strong, the foreign subsidiary will tend to 
create more liquidity. This international arbitrage behavior provides an opportunity to test 
whether the liquidity creation of foreign subsidiaries in the host countries is related to the 
banking powers in their home countries.  
We regress the banking powers (Banking Powers) in banks’ home countries 
(Banking Powers (Home)) on the liquidity created by their foreign subsidiaries in the host 
countries, LC(total)/GTA. In Column (1) of Table 2.9, we only include the home country 
banking powers and fixed effects. The coefficient on the home country banking powers is 
negative. The p-value is close to 0.10. In Column (2), we further control the 
macroeconomic factors in the home country. The coefficient on the home country banking 




country are considered and the bank-level characteristics are employed in Column (4). 
Overall, our results suggest that the liquidity creation of foreign subsidiaries in the host 
countries is significantly related to the banking powers of home countries. Foreign bank 
subsidiaries would create lower liquidity if their home country has higher banking powers. 
A possible implication of this result could be that the bank managers may allocate the 
banks’ resources among different subsidiaries and favor the ones in the country with more 
banking powers. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
National bank regulators set rules for banks to offer various financial services to 
their customers. While some countries may provide banks with more powers by allowing 
them to also engage in nontraditional commercial banking activities such as securities and 
insurance underwriting, and real estate investments besides traditional lending and deposit-
taking, some may restrict their activities only to traditional services. The literature focuses 
mostly on the bank risk especially after the debate about the universal banking is reignited 
due to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 in the United States.  
Given the importance of bank liquidity creation for the nonbank public such as 
firms and households, and the real economy (Berger & Sedunov, 2017), this paper 
investigates the effect of banking powers on one of the most comprehensive measures of 
bank output, which is bank liquidity creation. There are two contrasting predictions implied 
by the past studies in the literature. The certification view suggests that banks have 
informational advantages named economies of scale and scope due to their screening and 
monitoring activities during the lending relationships with the firms. These advantages 




stand-alone investment banks, insurance companies, and real estate investment trusts. 
Coupled with the cost and revenue efficiencies, combination of banking powers may create 
a synergy across different lines of businesses that banks offer and lead to an increase in 
bank liquidity creation (Drucker & Puri, 2005; Puri, 1999). On the other hand, conflict of 
interest view highlights the potential conflicts that may arise due to the banks’ lending 
power over their customers, their informational advantage, or simply their lack of expertise 
in other financial services (Kang & Liu, 2007; Puri, 1996; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). 
These conflicts may hinder potential businesses between banks and their customers.  
We find supportive evidence on the certification view that banking powers increase 
bank liquidity creation in home country. The results are robust to subsample tests and 
additional controls. We also examine the effect of banking powers in home country on 
liquidity created by banks’ foreign subsidiaries in the host country. Results show that higher 
banking powers in home country decrease bank liquidity creation of foreign subsidiaries. 
These results contribute to the international regulatory arbitrage in the financial services 
industry documented in the literature, which indicates that international banks may adjust 
their business strategy based on international banking powers.  
These results may have implications for the regulators and policymakers. First, 
universal banking may imply higher liquidity created for the nonbank public, which may 
boost the real economic output (Berger & Sedunov, 2017). However, combination of 
several lines of financial services may eventually build systemically important financial 
institutions, which may threaten financial stability. Furthermore, banks may need to gain 
expertise in non-core banking activities and hold more capital than their stand-alone 




subsidiaries of banks do not distort market competition or impose systemic risk to the 




Table 2.1: International Bank Liquidity Creation Construction 
 
Assets 
Illiquid Assets (weight 
=1/2) 
Semiliquid Assets 
















Trading Securities and at Fair 
Value through Income  
Other Mortgage Loans  
Loans and Advances 
to Banks  Available for Sale Securities   
Corporate and Commercial 
Loans  Held to Maturity Securities 
Other Loans    
At-equity Investment in 
Associates  
Investment in Property    Other Securities  
Other Earning Assets    Cash and Due from other Banks  
Foreclosed Real Estate   Insurance Assets  
Fixed Assets    
Goodwill     
Other Intangibles      
Current Tax Assets      
Deferred Tax Assets      
Discontinued Operations      
Other Assets      
Liabilities and Equity 




Illiquid Liability and Equity 
(weight =-1/2) 
Customer Deposits 
Other Deposits and 
Short-Term 
Borrowing  
Senior Debt Maturing after 1 
Year  
Deposits from Banks  Subordinated Borrowing  
Repos and Cash Collateral    Other Funding 
Trading Liabilities    Fair Value Portion of Debt 
   Credit Impairment Reserves  
   Reserves for Pensions and Other  
    Current Tax Liabilities  
    Deferred Tax Liabilities  
    Other Deferred Liabilities  
    Discontinued Operations  
    Insurance Liabilities  
    Other Liabilities  
  
Pref. Shares and Hybrid Capital 
accounted for as Debt  
  
Pref. Shares and Hybrid Capital 
accounted for as Equity  
    Common Equity  
    Non-controlling Interest  




    
Foreign Exchange Revaluation 
Reserves  
    
Fixed Assets Revaluation and 
other Accumulated Other 
Comprehensive Income 















Sheet     
Committed Credit Lines      
Other Contingent 
Liabilities      
Step 3: We combine bank activities classified in step 1 and weighted in step 2 to 
construct a liquidity creation measure "cat fat". 
Cat fat= 
+1/2 x illiquid assets 
+0 x Semiliquid assets -1/2 x liquid assets 
  
+1/2 x illiquid 
liabilities +0 x 
Semiliquid liabilities -1/2 x liquid liabilities 
   -1/2 x equity 
  
+1/2 x illiquid 
guarantees +0 x 
Semiliquid guarantees -1/2 x liquid guarantees 
 
This table illustrates the methodology to construct a modified Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
"cat fat" liquidity creation measure by using the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. 
In step 1, we classify all bank activities as liquid, semiliquid, or illiquid. In step 2, we assign 
weights to the activities classified in step 1. And finally, in step 3, we combine bank 
activities classified in step 1 and weighted in step 2 to construct a “cat fat” liquidity creation 










Table 2.2: Definition of Variables 
 
Dependent Variables 
LC(Total)/GTA Total bank liquidity creation normalized by corresponding gross total assets, winsorized at the 1% level. 
LC(Asset)/GTA 
Asset components of bank liquidity creation normalized by corresponding gross total assets,  
winsorized at the 1% level. 
LC(Liability)/GTA 
Liability components of bank liquidity creation normalized by  
corresponding gross total assets, winsorized at the 1% level. 
LC(Off)/GTA 
Off-balance sheet components of bank liquidity creation normalized by  
corresponding gross total assets, winsorized at the 1% level. 
Independent Variables 
Banking Powers An inverse measure of the regulatory restrictions on bank activities. 
 
Secur_power 
The extent to which banks may engage in underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities,  
and all aspects of the mutual fund industry. 
 
 
Insur_power The extent to which banks may engage in insurance underwriting and selling. 
 
 
Real_act The extent to which banks may engage in real estate investment, development and management. 
 
 
Control Variables   
Growth Real GDP percentage change, winsorized at the 1% level.  
 
 




Percentage change in GDP deflator index in local currency period average (2005 = 100),  













The ratio of assets of the three largest commercial banks to total commercial banking assets,  
winsorized at the 1%. 
 
GDP per capita 
The natural logarithm of GDP per capita,  




The natural logarithm of bank gross total assets,  
winsorized at the 1% level.  
 
Capital Ratio 
The ratio of total capital to gross total assets of each individual bank,  
winsorized at the 1% level.  
 
Overhead 
The ratio of overhead expenses to gross total assets of each individual bank,  
winsorized at the 1% level.  
 
Additional Controls  
Trade 
Merchandise trade balance as a percentage of GDP,  




Central government receipts minus central government outlays, as a percentage of GDP,  




Percentage change in M1 plus quasi-money at end-period, over previous year,  




Capital regulatory index, which is the sum of the overall capital stringency  
and the initial capital stringency.  
 
 
Law and Order 
Rule of law, a measure capturing the extent to which agents have confidence in and  
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,  
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime. 
 
Corruption 
Control of corruption, capturing the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,  


































Variables N Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75 
LC(Total)/GTA 141,537 52.315 26.164 40.274 56.803 69.169 
LC(Asset)/GTA 141,537 16.645 16.841 6.481 18.958 29.000 
LC(Liability)/GTA 141,537 29.466 17.579 29.120 35.215 38.785 
LC(Off)/GTA 141,537 5.832 9.196 1.667 3.947 7.000 
Banking Powers 141,537 4.024 1.269 3.000 4.000 4.000 
Growth 141,537 2.420 2.417 1.602 2.532 3.785 
Interest 141,537 6.643 4.747 3.269 5.088 7.994 
Inflation 141,537 3.092 3.564 1.535 2.064 2.750 
GDP per capita 141,537 10.336 0.886 10.504 10.643 10.781 
Deposit Insurance 141,537 0.969 0.175 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Concentration 141,537 45.013 16.630 31.050 43.760 47.100 
Ln (GTA) 141,537 5.253 1.751 4.094 4.956 6.045 
Capital Ratio 141,537 0.128 0.111 0.083 0.100 0.129 







Table 2.4: Banking Powers on Liquidity Creation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LC(total)/GTA LC(total)/GTA LC(total)/GTA LC(total)/GTA 
Independent Variables     
Banking Powers 0.997*** 1.266*** 1.236*** 1.192*** 
 (3.18) (4.83) (5.04) (4.71) 
Growth  0.285 0.279 0.255 
  (1.41) (1.47) (1.44) 
Interest  0.225 0.187 0.258* 
  (1.38) (1.21) (1.75) 
Inflation  0.038 0.040 0.035 
  (0.54) (0.54) (0.47) 
GDP per capita  -3.061 -1.805 -3.355 
  (-0.82) (-0.58) (-1.13) 
Deposit Insurance   -7.288 -6.737 
   (-1.42) (-1.28) 
Concentration   0.007 0.017 
   (0.18) (0.47) 
Ln (GTA)    1.206*** 
    (4.19) 
Capital Ratio    -29.485*** 
    (-5.65) 
Overhead    -4.163 
    (-1.13) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 141,537 141,537 141,537 141,537 
Adjusted R-squared 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.822 
 







variable is the liquidity creation LC(total)/GTA, which is total bank liquidity creation normalized by corresponding gross total assets. 
The key explanatory variable is Banking Powers, which is the inverse measure of bank activity restriction across different countries. We 
include a broad set of country controls such as, Growth (country GDP growth rate), Interest (lending interest rate), Inflation (rate of 
inflation), GDP per capita (the natural logarithm of country GDP per capita), Deposit Insurance (deposit insurance scheme), 
Concentration (bank concentration ratio) and a broad set of bank level controls such as Ln (GTA) (the natural logarithm of bank gross 
total assets), Capital (the bank capital ratio), Overhead (the ratio of overhead cost to gross total assets). These variables are lagged one 
year. In addition, year fixed effects and bank fixed effects are added. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are 









Table 2.5: Banking Powers on the Components of Liquidity Creation  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LC(Total)/GTA LC(Asset)/GTA LC(Liability)/GTA  LC(Off)GTA 
Independent Variables     
Banking Powers 1.192*** 0.889*** -0.167 0.468** 
 (4.71) (4.21) (-1.42) (2.22) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 141,537 141,537 141,537 141,537 
Adjusted R-squared 0.822 0.779 0.893 0.723 
 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for analyzing the effects of banking powers on bank liquidity creation. The dependent 
variable is the liquidity creation LC(total)/GTA, which is total bank liquidity creation normalized by corresponding gross total assets in 
Column (1). In Columns (2), (3) and (4), the dependent variables are the different components of the liquidity creation. They are asset 
component of liquidity creation LC(Asset)/GTA, the liability side component of liquidity creation LC(Liability)/GTA, and the off-balance 
sheet side component of liquidity creation LC(Off)/GTA, respectively. The key explanatory variable is Banking Powers, which is the 
inverse measure of activity restriction across different countries. We include a broad set of control variables as in the Column (4) of 
Table 2.4. These variables are lagged one year. In addition, year fixed effects and bank fixed effects are added. t-statistics are reported 














Table 2.6: Components of Banking Powers on Liquidity Creation 
 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for analyzing the effects of banking powers on bank liquidity creation. The dependent 
variable is the liquidity creation LC(total)/GTA, which is total bank liquidity creation normalized by corresponding gross total assets. 
The key explanatory variables are the different components of Banking Powers index. They are Secur_power, Insur_power, and 
Real_power. We include a broad set of control variables as in the Column (4) of Table 2.4. These variables are lagged one year. In 
addition, year fixed effects and bank fixed effects are added. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at 
country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LC(Total)/GTA LC(Total)/GTA LC(Total)/GTA LC(Total)/GTA 
Independent Variables     
Secur_power 1.273***   0.907** 
 (3.09)   (2.41) 
Insur_ power  1.737***  1.467*** 
  (3.50)  (3.02) 
Real_ power   1.178* 1.141* 
   (1.86) (1.76) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 141,537 141,537 141,537 141,537 








Table 2.7: Banking Powers on Liquidity Creation by Subsamples 
 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for analyzing the effects of banking powers on bank liquidity creation. The dependent 
variable is the liquidity creation LC(total)/GTA, which is total bank liquidity creation normalized by corresponding gross total assets. 
The key explanatory variable is Banking Powers, which is the inverse measure of activity restriction across different countries. We 
include a broad set of control variables as in the Column (4) of Table 2.4. These variables are lagged one year. In addition, year fixed 
effects and bank fixed effects are added. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at country level. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 










































Variables         
Banking 
Powers 1.192*** 0.829*** 1.442** 0.913*** 1.182*** 1.107*** 1.201*** 1.197*** 
 (4.71) (2.78) (2.55) (2.65) (4.68) (4.18) (4.75) (4.72) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 141,537 121,365 20,172 33,890 141,373 133,665 141,438 141,468 
Adjusted R-
squared 








Table 2.8: Additional Controls 
 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for analyzing the effects of banking powers on bank liquidity creation with additional 
controls. The dependent variable is the liquidity creation LC(total)/GTA, which is total bank liquidity creation normalized by 
corresponding gross total assets. The key explanatory variable is Banking Powers, which is the inverse measure of activity restriction 
across different countries. We include a broad set of control variables as same as in the Column (4) of Table 2.4. Additional controls are 
trade balance (Trade), budget balance as percentage of GDP (Budget), M2 (M2), banking capital regulation (Capital Regulation), 
corruption (Corruption), law and order (Law and Order), respectively. These variables are lagged one year. Year fixed effects and bank 
fixed effects are also added. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at country level. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
















Independent Variables               
Banking Powers 1.192*** 1.123*** 1.217*** 1.200*** 1.551*** 1.147*** 1.210*** 
 (4.71) (4.63) (4.88) (4.62) (3.59) (4.80) (4.30) 
Trade  -0.278*      
  (-1.84)      
Budget   0.107     
   (0.63)     
M2    0.022    
    (0.57)    
Capital Regulation     0.215   
     (0.34)   
Corruption      0.764  
      (1.02)  
Law and Order       0.543 
       (0.43) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 141,537 141,537 141,232 141,353 78,510 141,537 141,537 








Table 2.9: Home Country Banking Powers on Subsidiary Liquidity Creation  










Independent Variables         
Banking Powers (home) -0.538 -0.863* -0.987** -1.190*** 
 (-1.21) (-1.86) (-2.28) (-2.81) 
Growth (home)  0.217 0.203 0.244 
  (0.99) (0.92) (1.20) 
Interest (home)  0.203 0.193 0.206 
  (0.9) (0.94) (1.04) 
Inflation (home)  -0.222 -0.230 -0.215 
  (-1.58) (-1.64) (-1.54) 
GDP per capita (home)  5.421*** 4.897*** 4.016** 
  (3.58) (2.99) (2.58) 
Deposit Insurance (home)   6.108 6.455 
   (1.03) (1.09) 
Concentration (home)   0.072 0.092** 
   (1.39) (2.02) 
Ln (GTA)    -0.222 
    (-0.12) 
Capital Ratio    -46.474*** 
    (-5.51) 
Overhead    -12.733 
    (-0.96) 
     
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Host x year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,649 5,649 5,649 5,385 








This table reports OLS regression estimates for analyzing the effects of home country banking powers on bank liquidity creation. Our 
sample includes international banks’ foreign subsidiaries operating across countries. The dependent variable is the liquidity creation 
LC(total)/GTA, which is total bank liquidity creation normalized by corresponding gross total assets. The key explanatory variable is 
Banking Powers (home), which is the inverse measure of activity restriction at home country. We also include a broad set of country 
controls at home country such as, Growth (home) (country GDP growth rate), Interest (home) (lending interest rate), Inflation (home) 
(country rate of inflation), GDP per capita (home) (the natural logarithm of country GDP per capita), Deposit insurance (home) (deposit 
insurance), Concentration (home) (the ratio of assets of the three largest commercial banks to total commercial banking assets) and a 
broad set of bank level controls such as Ln (GTA) (the natural logarithm of bank gross total assets), Capital Ratio (the bank capital ratio), 
Overhead (the ratio of overhead cost to gross total assets). These variables are lagged one year. The host country×year and bank fixed 
effects are also added. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at country level. ***, **, * indicate 

























Table 2.10: The Statistics of Main Variables by Country 
 
Country Name LC(Total)/GTA LC(Asset)/GTA LC(Liability)/GTA LC(Off)/GTA Banking Powers Obs. 
ALGERIA 51.56 14.53 15.50 21.28 6.34 93 
ARGENTINA 34.20 19.92 9.36 4.46 4.50 781 
ARMENIA 41.17 12.77 24.79 3.05 3.80 137 
AUSTRALIA 42.64 18.21 17.17 7.10 4.66 244 
AUSTRIA 46.52 18.26 23.08 4.85 7.35 723 
BANGLADESH 72.46 25.59 32.61 14.28 2.62 265 
BELARUS 44.97 20.14 15.40 8.94 4.26 86 
BELGIUM 44.01 3.22 27.94 10.95 6.06 337 
BOLIVIA 49.70 17.95 26.26 5.50 3.19 115 
BOTSWANA 50.93 9.56 34.30 7.07 3.15 88 
BRAZIL 20.60 11.16 0.20 7.60 5.78 1,147 
BULGARIA 54.02 20.25 27.43 6.07 5.37 264 
CAMEROON 69.30 24.07 33.27 11.96 4.17 46 
CANADA 60.48 14.35 34.02 12.89 6.49 146 
CHILE 38.93 20.94 13.68 3.70 2.95 182 
CHINA 55.34 10.34 36.96 7.72 1.46 876 
COLOMBIA 61.19 23.22 26.83 11.19 2.62 215 
COSTA RICA 56.16 23.86 26.81 5.57 2.25 195 
COTE D'IVOIRE 68.93 26.05 35.56 7.33 4.59 83 
CROATIA 46.47 16.90 25.27 4.28 6.00 398 
CYPRUS 47.78 10.44 30.85 6.09 4.70 92 
CZECH REPUBLIC 46.47 10.34 26.85 9.24 3.70 159 
DENMARK 55.49 20.14 24.23 10.63 5.00 479 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 43.68 21.38 19.97 2.43 3.04 272 
ECUADOR 50.04 23.23 26.47 0.25 2.97 145 
EGYPT 50.74 7.47 34.88 8.35 4.33 329 
EL SALVADOR 32.74 14.00 16.51 1.99 3.17 151 








FRANCE 61.54 22.53 25.53 13.30 5.14 1,007 
GERMANY 50.31 14.21 27.25 6.74 7.35 1,106 
GHANA 42.65 8.80 27.24 6.60 3.43 136 
GREECE 65.95 23.76 34.32 7.64 5.78 117 
GUATEMALA 47.53 16.45 28.31 1.77 3.23 329 
HONDURAS 99.21 22.51 26.62 55.80 4.30 164 
HONG KONG 30.33 -0.12 22.63 7.82 8.72 69 
HUNGARY 58.06 17.46 29.71 10.78 4.55 199 
INDIA 63.67 11.33 31.53 19.53 3.33 833 
INDONESIA 57.53 23.08 27.71 6.69 2.37 505 
IRELAND 20.25 4.75 0.67 14.83 7.17 30 
ISRAEL 62.16 17.81 33.02 11.33 2.32 124 
ITALY 51.09 21.79 16.25 11.93 4.01 1,268 
JAPAN 57.96 19.21 37.47 0.65 3.65 1,417 
KAZAKHSTAN 38.51 13.00 16.75 8.60 3.31 88 
KENYA 54.35 18.38 26.59 9.22 3.64 292 
LATVIA 54.15 17.80 32.57 3.14 6.54 259 
LEBANON 30.60 -11.61 37.69 4.41 3.69 225 
LITHUANIA 60.93 20.59 35.03 5.11 4.77 136 
LUXEMBOURG 45.20 1.96 32.37 10.85 6.63 937 
MALAYSIA 42.61 3.47 20.12 17.26 4.15 294 
MEXICO 32.65 11.09 15.60 5.53 5.02 217 
MOROCCO 66.71 21.99 33.89 10.82 3.70 70 
MOZAMBIQUE 48.08 16.57 24.71 6.80 5.15 68 
NETHERLANDS 45.60 12.41 27.11 5.84 7.15 136 
NEW ZEALAND 43.05 17.10 19.00 6.95 7.47 66 
NIGERIA 38.41 7.12 21.04 10.26 4.27 184 
NORWAY 31.20 9.31 15.54 5.28 5.83 143 
PAKISTAN 51.87 10.83 32.35 8.06 2.89 279 
PANAMA 50.93 19.72 29.32 1.76 3.66 392 








PERU 89.85 29.32 22.57 41.81 4.90 192 
PHILIPPINES 45.21 11.57 26.10 7.56 7.00 186 
POLAND 64.09 18.38 28.61 16.49 4.11 447 
PORTUGAL 50.12 22.73 18.78 8.05 5.02 243 
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 38.71 20.90 15.42 2.39 2.58 161 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 12.85 24.60 -12.64 0.69 6.40 7,872 
SENEGAL 68.80 24.15 34.01 10.60 4.65 101 
SINGAPORE 48.89 13.17 25.63 10.05 5.26 92 
SLOVAKIA 52.60 10.45 34.52 7.64 4.27 115 
SLOVENIA 60.77 20.70 31.18 8.34 4.79 132 
SOUTH AFRICA 28.35 12.39 9.17 3.91 5.04 192 
SPAIN 55.23 20.86 25.19 8.65 6.82 563 
SRI LANKA 52.27 20.29 20.03 11.92 4.39 169 
SWEDEN 70.38 29.00 26.60 14.34 4.53 170 
SWITZERLAND 18.53 -2.01 15.34 4.50 7.33 1,815 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 53.75 10.08 34.06 9.61 3.49 45 
THAILAND 59.68 24.55 23.65 10.79 3.29 287 
TURKEY 69.87 10.35 10.98 39.90 4.07 56 
UGANDA 39.44 11.97 19.91 7.57 0.99 99 
UKRAINE 56.33 27.01 26.58 2.31 7.00 163 
UNITED KINGDOM 36.46 9.71 18.22 8.33 8.35 867 
TANZANIA 51.73 11.94 33.91 5.89 5.87 179 
USA 56.24 16.59 33.81 5.49 3.63 107,647 
URUGUAY 53.94 10.63 30.89 12.49 4.31 202 
VENEZUELA 70.42 2.12 29.64 38.02 4.32 222 
ZIMBABWE 49.71 17.44 28.66 3.62 5.00 25 





CHAPTER 3: DOES FINANCIAL REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY 
LEAD TO SYSTEMIC RISK?
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty has negative impacts on several aspects of an economy. Consumers 
decrease their consumption expenditures during uncertain times (Baker et al., 2016) and 
investors are discouraged from committing to long-term investments (Gulen & Ion, 2016; 
Higgs, 1997; Nodari, 2014). Therefore, the real effects of uncertainty might be prolonging 
(Bloom, 2009). Along with these concerns, heightened uncertainty is also associated with 
a more fragile financial system (Dicks & Fulghieri, 2019).  
These issues caused by high uncertainty might be resolved via a healthier financial 
system since it can allocate funds to the nonbank public such as households and firms in 
an efficient way. Healthy financial system can be supported by precise financial regulation 
enacted and implemented fast and efficiently. This is needed the most especially when 
there is a systemic buildup or even financial crisis since uncertainty in the economy is 
already widespread at those times.  
Managing the beliefs and expectations of investors by anchoring them to the 
intended outcome of these policies is the key for success. As noted widely in the monetary 
policy literature, a clear and credible policy would help achieve that goal of policymakers 
and regulators by boosting the public confidence. However, uncertainty in financial 




heighten the opacity of banks, and information asymmetries (Morgan, 2002). This may in 
turn lead to an increase in the noise about the banks’ idiosyncratic shocks and loan 
portfolios which can spill over onto other banks, building up a systemic event. Another bad 
type of equilibrium is the credit crunch where banks may invest only in the safe assets and 
abstain from lending. Either types of equilibrium may lead to costly and inefficient results. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2012) show that if uncertainty about a policy change is high, then 
there would be large equity devaluations. Furthermore, these policy changes also surge 
stock market volatility and correlations across stock prices, which may pave the way for a 
systemic event. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the importance of financial regulation 
uncertainty for the systemic contributions of banks in the U.S.  
To test the effects of uncertainty in financial regulations developed by Baker et al. 
(2016) on systemic risk contributions of banks measured by widely-accepted measures of 
systemic risk, we employ a sample of 24,007 bank-quarter observations from 1994:Q1 to 
2014:Q4. Our findings suggest that financial regulatory uncertainty positively and 
significantly affects systemic risk contribution of banks in the U.S. Particularly, a one-
standard-deviation increase in financial regulation uncertainty leads to a 5.36 percentage 
points increase in NSRISK relative to its average. Regarding the other systemic risk 
measures, a one-standard-deviation increase in financial regulation uncertainty leads to 
8.1%, 33.6%, 7.6%, and 18.8% increase in SES, MES, LVG, and ΔCOVAR relative to 
their averages, respectively.  
To address the reverse causality concerns where regulatory bodies may act 
proactively in case, they become aware of the rise in the systemic risk and create 




approach with the help of regulatory uncertainty by Baker et al. (2016). In case there is a 
general wave of regulation in the economy, financial markets may also be considered as 
the target for the next regulation action. Therefore, there might be a surged uncertainty in 
financial markets when there is high regulatory uncertainty in general. One could not think 
about any obvious channel for how the regulatory uncertainty in unrelated sectors can lead 
to systemic risk contributions of banks in a way other than through its effect on financial 
regulation uncertainty. The results are robust to the endogeneity concerns.  
There are two main channels documented in this study behind the impact of 
financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk. The first channel is the worsening bank 
loan portfolios. For instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in financial regulation 
uncertainty leads to 23.5% and 31.6% increases in loan loss provisions ratio and in non-
performing loans ratio of banks relative to their averages, respectively. The second channel 
is the increased stock market volatility. However, this channel is weak in terms of 
economic significance. A one-standard-deviation increase in financial regulation 
uncertainty leads to a 21.3% increase in volatility of bank stock returns relative to its 
average.  
Furthermore, reinforcing effect of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk 
is valid especially during the financial crises defined by Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
Therefore, when precise financial regulation is needed the most, uncertainty in these 
regulations would lead to heightened systemic risk.  
With regards to the heterogenous effects of financial regulation uncertainty on 
systemic risk contributions of different bank classes, results display that effects are mostly 




situation might be triggered by the heightened moral hazard incentives of large banks since 
they are considered as “too-big-to-fail”. Moreover, this study reports that banks with higher 
non-performing loans ratio, lower liquidity ratio and lower noninterest income ratio are 
affected more negatively by the uncertainty in financial regulations.  
As an evidence regarding the long-term effects of financial regulatory uncertainty, 
its positive and statistically significant effect on systemic risk continues up to three to four 
quarters. This may slow down the economic recovery process after uncertainty shocks. To 
better argue about the impact of uncertainty on systemic risk via financial regulation but 
not economy wide uncertainty, we controlled for economic policy uncertainty and the non-
overlapping part of regulatory uncertainty with financial regulation uncertainty developed 
by Baker et al. (2016). Our results are robust to these specifications as well as when we 
control for the federal funds rate.  
This paper is related to several lines of literature. First, this study provides insights 
to a broader literature that examines the contributing factors to systemic buildups and 
contagious effects. The contagious effects of uncertainty are noted in this stand of literature 
via the interbank lending market (& and Gale, 2000), excessive portfolio rebalancing after 
the shocks (Gârleanu et al., 2015), stock market volatility, equity devaluations, and 
increased stock price correlations (Pastor & Veronesi, 2012; Uhlig, 2010), and more 
educated and sophisticated investors who are uncertainty-avoidant exiting the stock 
markets and leaving the market to noisy, speculative and unsophisticated investors (Chew 
et al., 2018; Dicks & Fulghieri, 2019). Our results support the heightened stock market 
volatility findings of Brogaard and Detzel (2015), Liu and Zhang (2015), and Pastor and 




Uncertainty may also lead to an increase in the noise about the banks’ idiosyncratic 
shocks and loan portfolios which can spill over onto other banks, building up a systemic 
event. This study also provides supportive evidence to the lemons problem by Akerlof 
(1970) displaying that uncertainty increases the opacity of the banks and borrowers via 
heightened nonperforming loans and loan loss reserves of banks after an increase in 
financial regulation uncertainty.  
Another mechanism that uncertainty may affect the financial system is the 
heightened perceived systemic risk and risk aversion, especially after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers (Huang et al., 2012). Most importantly, Dicks and Fulghieri (2019) 
highlight that uncertainty aversion of investors may lead to a new source of systemic risk. 
Results of this paper complement this argument by identifying a specific type of 
uncertainty, which is financial regulatory uncertainty and by empirically testing their 
theoretical model.  
This paper’s results also add on to the research which held the heightened 
uncertainty responsible for the slower recovery after systemic events. Uncertainty 
amplifies the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks into systemic events and leads to 
contagious effects among banks and bank assets. For instance, Ilut and Schneider (2014) 
display that shocks to the confidence levels in the economy account for 70% of business 
cycle fluctuations. Furthermore, Stock and Watson (2012) highlight the underlying reason 
behind the slow recovery of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) as surged uncertainty. 
Therefore, our results on the significant adverse impacts of financial regulation uncertainty 





The remainder of this paper proceeds as the following. The next section presents 
the past studies and forms the testable hypothesis. Section 3.3 describes the measures of 
financial regulatory uncertainty and systemic risk contributions of banks and provides the 
descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 describes the main methodology and control variables. 
Section 3.5 reports the main empirical results that test the link between uncertainty on 
financial regulation and banks’ contribution to systemic risk, including instrumental 
variable analysis, subsample analyses and robustness checks. Finally, section 3.6 presents 
the conclusions and policy implications.  
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Systemic events occur mostly during the high level of widespread uncertainty 
periods in the economy (Dicks & Fulghieri, 2019). There are several reasons behind the 
association of financial crises and uncertainty noted in the literature. The very first reason 
may stem from the opaqueness of banks. They are considered to be black boxes and it is 
hard to quantify the risks associated with their loan structures (Morgan, 2002). On top of 
their opaqueness, an extra layer of uncertainty imposed into the markets by financial 
regulations would heighten their opacity. It may become harder to assess their true 
fundamentals for the investors due to the increased information asymmetries and 
disagreements among the investors and analysts. Therefore, the noise in the market about 
the banks’ idiosyncratic risks may surge, which reminds us the lemons problem of Akerlof 
(1970). In other words, investors and financial analysts would underrate some relatively 
safe loans and overrate some relatively risky ones, which in turn strengthens the uncertainty 
(Morgan, 2002). Hence, uncertainty may work through loans channel by reinforcing the 




are opaque given that banks may lend to opaque borrowers (Diamond, 1984; Morgan, 
2002). In short, opaqueness of banks’ assets may trigger systemic events.  
Another channel for uncertainty to impact systemic risk can be through the 
uncertainty avoidance of investors (Dicks & Fulghieri, 2019). Dicks and Fulghieri (2019) 
point out that since investors perform aversion to uncertainty (Ellsberg, 1961; Keynes, 
1921), they form their risky asset portfolios according to uncertainty hedging. That paper 
display that even a negative idiosyncratic shock for a bank or an asset class may distort 
investor sentiment and create a pessimism wave about the fundamentals of other banks or 
other asset classes. Similar cases were observed during GFC when Lehman Brothers 
collapsed, and this negativity spilled over on to the other banks in the financial system. 
Likewise, when a relatively small asset class of subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets 
reported a financial loss, all other asset classes were impacted adversely. The main 
theoretical reason is that uncertainty may alter the known-unknown distribution of 
expected cash flows of a bank or asset to an unknown-unknown distribution, i.e. Knightian 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921). This situation may distort the beliefs of investors about the 
future performance of other risky assets in their portfolios and lead assets or banks to 
display equity devaluations simultaneously. Uhlig (2010) also reports the negative impact 
of uncertainty-avoidant investors on asset prices when an adverse shock is received in the 
economy. Another supportive evidence is marked by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) 
highlighting the flight to quality behavior of uncertainty-avoidant investors due to their 
pessimism in other words, fearing the worst-case scenario. In this way, a negative shock 




mechanisms, uncertainty-avoidant investors may help a negative idiosyncratic event to 
spill over onto other banks or asset and thus, increase the systemic risk.  
Past studies in the literature put forward other potential mechanisms behind the 
effect of uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of banks. For instance, Allen and Gale 
(2000) state that contagious effects may be prominent via interbank lending market. 
Following their idea, financial regulation uncertainty may cause banks to sell the same 
risky assets to other banks in the interbank lending market as noisy announcements 
regarding specific asset classes are received. Another possible transmission mechanism 
from financial regulation uncertainty to systemic risk might be effective via investors’ 
excessive portfolio rebalancing (Gârleanu et al., 2015) after noisy news regarding the 
financial regulations. A high level of uncertainty can even lead ambiguity-averse investors, 
who are more educated and sophisticated, to exit the stock markets after their uncertainty 
avoidance is triggered thereby, leaving the stock market to noisy, speculative and 
unsophisticated investors (Chew et al., 2018; Dicks & Fulghieri, 2019). Another channel 
is documented by Pastor and Veronesi (2012). That paper display that stock prices decrease 
during an announcement of a policy change and this decline is larger if uncertainty about 
this policy is high. Furthermore, these policy changes surge stock market volatilities and 
correlations among stocks (Pastor & Veronesi, 2012).  
In the light of findings and potential mechanisms listed in the past studies, we form 
the following testable hypothesis:  
H1a: High financial regulation uncertainty predicts higher systemic risk 






In this section, we describe the dependent variable and the key independent 
variables for main analysis and provide their summary statistics and correlations.  
Due to the global financial crisis, measuring systemic risk contributions of banks 
gained importance and researchers have found several ways to quantify it. This study 
focuses on three widely accepted measures of systemic risk in the finance literature. 
Measures of systemic risk used in this paper are systematic expected shortfall (SES) as a 
linear combination of marginal expected shortfall (MES) and leverage (LVG), which are 
described by Acharya et al. (2017), expected capital shortfall of a bank conditional on a 
crisis (SRISK) developed by Acharya et al. (2012) and refined by Brownlees and Engle 
(2017) and ΔCoVaR, which is the difference in the value at risk (VaR) of the aggregate 
market conditional on a single bank is moving from its median stock returns to a financially 
distressed situation, defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). Detailed descriptions on 
calculation of these systemic risk variables can be found in the cited studies, however a 
brief description is provided in this study.  
First two measures, SES and SRISK, are rooted in the same sense of logical 
reasoning such that a bank’s financial distress may spill over on the other banks in the 
financial system and may impose huge costs on the health of the financial system. This 
may happen especially when the system as a whole also experiences financial distress. This 
leads to a bad equilibrium where capital needs of a distressed bank might not be supplied 
by other banks in the financial system. Therefore, financial system may become more 




Systemic risk measures take banks’ leverage and stock return distributions into account in 
situations where financial market as a whole is undercapitalized.  
The first measure employed in this analysis for each bank’s systemic risk 
contribution is SRISK, which is first defined by Acharya et al. (2012) and then refined by 
Brownlees and Engle (2017). SRISK measures the expected capital shortfall of a bank 
conditional on a crisis and it is a function of leverage, size and marginal expected shortfall 
(MES) of each bank. It employs a dynamic copula method (Patton, 2006) which models 
joint tail dependence of the bank’s stock returns and market returns to estimate the long-
run MES.  
This measure is able to capture both the aggregate systemic risk of the financial 
system as well as the contribution of each bank to this aggregate systemic risk. Brownlees 
and Engle (2017) define the aggregate SRISK as the total amount of expected capital 
shortage of the whole financial system in case of systemic event, that is financial distress. 
On the other hand, each bank’s SRISK is the amount of this expected capital shortage 
imposed only by a specific bank. SRISK is capable of predicting the highest contributor of 
all the financial institutions to the heightening systemic risk during GFC. In addition, this 
measure can predict adverse effects of contribution to systemic risk on the real economy 
via dropped industrial production levels and increased unemployment rates (Brownlees & 
Engle, 2016).  
Another systemic risk measure examined in this paper is systemic expected 
shortfall (SES), which is defined as a “bank’s propensity to be undercapitalized when the 
system as a whole is undercapitalized” (Acharya et al., 2017, p.2). SES measures expected 




whole system. It is estimated via a structural model where banks aim to maximize their 
own risk-adjusted return by selecting a risk profile and amount of capital to raise. On the 
other hand, benevolent regulator should consider additional costs of failed banks on third 
parties such as insured creditors, bailout costs and externalities on the rest of the economy. 
The externality is in effect whenever there is no room for other banks to respond to the 
capital needs of a bank. In other words, aggregate capital available in the whole financial 
system should be at least a fraction of aggregate assets in the financial markets. Otherwise, 
a bank’s undercapitalization may trigger a systemic event via situations such as fire sales 
of assets and interdependence of banks through their balance sheets and therefore, may 
lead to a credit crunch.  
There are two linear contributors to this measure since capital can be provided 
either from the credit market or from the stock market in general. Capital shortfall in credit 
market is measured via an approximation for leverage, which is the ratio of quasi-market 
value of assets to market value of equity (Acharya et al., 2017).8 On the other hand, capital 
shortfall in stock markets is indicated via MES, which captures “the average return of each 
bank during the 5% worst days for the market” (Acharya et al., 2017, p.4), where the market 
return is the CRSP value-weighted return. Rolling window estimation scheme is used to 
account for the changes in distribution of returns over time (Brownlees & Engle, 2017). 
Brownlees and Engle (2017) redefined MES as a dynamic measure by considering the 
lower tail dependence among bank returns and market returns, i.e. the increased correlation 
between bank and market returns especially during systemic events.  
 
 
8 Quasi-market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets plus market value of 




Empirical validity of these measures is tested by Acharya et al., (2017). These ex 
ante measures of contribution of banks to systemic risk are able to predict the ex-post 
systemic risk contributions of banks, such as capital shortages of banks in bank stress tests, 
decrease in banks’ stock returns and increase in credit default spreads (CDS) during GFC.  
The last measure, ΔCoVaR, calculates the change in the financial system’s 
aggregate value-at-risk conditional on a particular bank is undercapitalized relative to its 
median state in terms of stock return distributions (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2016). This 
measure has a different way of measuring systemic risk than SES and SRISK since its 
conditionality is reversed. Another difference is its sole reliance on stock markets and the 
absence of credit markets in the measurement. Time-variant ΔCoVaR measures are 
computed with the help of quantile regressions of asset returns of portfolios sorted 
according to maturity mismatch, leverage, market-to-book and size on several state 
variables including stock market volatility, liquidity spread, slope of the yield curve and 
credit spread.  
All systemic risk measures are on daily basis except quarterly measured LVG, and 
thus SES. Therefore, all these daily measures are aggregated at the quarterly level by taking 
the average of daily measures in a specific quarter. Apart from that, SRISK measure is 
employed by first calculating the average of daily SRISK measures in a given quarter and 
then, dividing this value by the average of daily market capitalizations of a bank in that 
quarter. This quarterly measure will be referred as NSRISK (normalized SRISK) and it is 
employed in the main analysis rather than SRISK itself. The reason behind this 




results. These measures are estimated by using the corresponding definitions of these 
measures in the above-mentioned papers.  
Financial regulation uncertainty index (FinRegU) developed by Baker et al. (2016)9 
is employed to test the effects of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk 
contributions of banks in the U.S. This index is developed as a categorical sub-index of 
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) by following the news-based component of that index. 
In other words, calculation of FinRegU requires to account for the frequency of articles in 
ten leading U.S. newspapers that include at least one keyword from three different 
categories of EPU that are economic, policy and uncertainty. The keywords are selected 
after a comprehensive and long-haul textual analysis as the following: “economic” or 
“economy”; “uncertain” or “uncertainty”; and one or more of “congress”, “deficit”, 
“Federal Reserve”, “legislation”, “regulation” or “White House”. In addition to this 
criterion, articles for the FinRegU should involve at least one category-relevant term stated 
as the following:  
“banking (or bank) supervision, Glass-Steagall, TARP, thrift 
supervision, Dodd-Frank, financial reform, commodity futures trading 
commission, CFTC, House Financial Services Committee, Basel, capital 
requirement, Volcker rule, bank stress test, Securities and Exchange 








It is important to note that the frequency of articles including at least one keywords 
from the defined categories are first standardized for each newspaper within the 
corresponding time period and then normalized to obtain the monthly FinRegU index. We 
employ the natural logarithm of the average of the monthly FinRegU index in a specific 
quarter as implemented in Gulen and Ion (2016). To mitigate the concerns of reverse 
causality, I used one-quarter lagged values of the quarterly ln_FinRegU index throughout 
the analyses.  
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics, and correlations for the variables used in the 
analyses. Panel A reports summary statistics for the dependent variables, key independent 
variable and control variables.  
Systemic risk variables have 24,007 bank-quarter observations from 1994:Q1 to 
2014:Q4. The mean values of these variables cannot be interpreted meaningfully however, 
negative values in NSRISK can be considered as expected excess capital for those banks. 
Moreover, the distributions of these systemic risk measures are different from each other 
by looking at their first and second moments, and their 25th and 75th percentiles. Similarly, 
interpreting the key independent variable, ln_FinRegU also does not yield meaningful 
conclusions.  
Table 3.1 Panel B presents correlations of the dependent variables and key 
independent variable. The positive and mostly strong correlation coefficients among the 
systemic risk measures provide us with the information that each of these variables may 
have overlapping parts with other measures. The correlation between systemic risk 





3.4 REGRESSION METHODOLOGY AND CONTROLS 
In this section, we describe the regression methodology and control variables 
employed in the main analysis.  
To test the predictions of the hypothesis, we estimate the following regression 
model:  
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽 ln_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑈𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜏𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖,𝑡,               (1) 
where i indexes a bank, and t indicates a year-quarter. The dependent variable is one of the 
systemic risk measures, NSRISK, SES, MES, LVG or ΔCOVAR for a specific bank in a 
given quarter. The key independent variable is the natural logarithm of the quarterly 
average of monthly financial regulation uncertainty index (ln_FinRegU) defined by Baker 
et al. (2016). We employ the one quarter-lagged independent variables to mitigate potential 
reverse-causality concerns. The regression model includes a comprehensive set of control 
variables to separate the effects of financial regulation uncertainty. Bank-level controls (X) 
include Capital Adequacy, NPL Ratio, Overhead Cost Ratio, Earnings, Liquidity, 
Sensitivity to Market Risk, Noninterest Income Ratio, Bank Size, and HHI to consider 
differences across ratio of Tier 1 capital to gross total assets, ratio of the non-performing 
loans to total loans, ratio of total operating expenses to gross total assets, ratio of return on 
assets to gross total assets, ratio of the sum of the cash and securities to total assets, ratio 
of the absolute difference between short-term assets and short-term liabilities to gross total 
assets, ratio of noninterest income to total assets, natural log of the gross total assets, and 
bank-level competition, respectively. Finally, we include bank fixed effects (α) to control 
for omitted bank characteristics that are invariant over time, and a set of seasonal quarter 




cluster standard errors at the bank and year-quarter level to account for potential cross-
sectional and serial correlation in the error term.  
Table 3.1 Panel A displays the summary statistics for the control variables, as well 
as the variables for channels, subsamples, robustness tests and instrumental variable.  
Bank-specific variables like the proxies of CAMELS – Capital Adequacy, NPL 
Ratio, Overhead Cost Ratio, Earnings, Liquidity, Sensitivity to Market Risk – and other 
bank-level controls like Noninterest Income Ratio and Bank Size are obtained from Call 
Reports. The degree of concentration of a bank in the markets is taken into consideration 
by Herfindahl-Hirschman Deposits Index (HHI), where the weights depend on the 
proportion of deposits of the corresponding bank in all areas (Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) or counties, if not included in MSA) in which a bank has a business. HHI is 
computed by the author with the help of the FDIC Summary of Deposits.  
The average Tier1 capital ratio (Capital Adequacy) in percentage points is 0.827 as 
this indicator is multiplied by 10,000 in this analysis to scale it properly. The 25th and 75th 
percentile values of HHI based on bank deposits state that there is a big variation in bank-
level competition. The average NPL Ratio of banks (multiplied by 100 for scaling reasons) 
is 1.246 whereas the average Overhead Cost Ratio is 0.035. The averages of Earnings, 
Liquidity, Sensitivity to Market Risk, and Noninterest Income Ratio are 2.288, 0.254, 0.163 
and 0.816, respectively where Earnings and Noninterest Income Ratio are also multiplied 
by 100 for scaling reasons.  
3.5 RESULTS 
In this section, I present my results from the tests for the effects of financial 




results of instrumental variable analysis, channels underlying the effects, subsample 
analyses by bank size classes, normal versus crises times, and the other bank classes based 
on fundamental balance sheet items, the effects over time, and robustness checks.  
Table 3.2 presents coefficient estimates from regressions of systemic risk 
contributions of banks, NSRISK, SES, MES, LVG and ΔCOVAR, on financial regulation 
uncertainty (ln_FinRegUt-1) controlling for Capital Adequacy, NPL Ratio, Overhead Cost 
Ratio, Earnings, Liquidity, Sensitivity to Market Risk, Noninterest Income Ratio, Bank Size, 
and HHI to consider differences across ratio of Tier 1 capital to gross total assets, ratio of 
the non-performing loans to total loans, ratio of total operating expenses to gross total 
assets, ratio of return on assets to gross total assets, ratio of the sum of the cash and 
securities to total assets, ratio of the absolute difference between short-term assets and 
short-term liabilities to gross total assets, ratio of noninterest income to total assets, natural 
log of the gross total assets, and bank-level competition, respectively.  
In all these regression models with different systemic risk measure as the dependent 
variable, coefficient estimate of financial regulation uncertainty is positive and highly 
significant (at 1% level for NSRISK, MES and ΔCOVAR, however at 10% level for SES 
and LVG). Therefore, the results suggest that when there is a high level of uncertainty 
regarding the financial regulations, banks contribute more to systemic risk on average. It 
is important to note that these results are economically significant as well. A one-standard-
deviation increase in financial regulation uncertainty leads to a 5.36 percentage points 
increase in NSRISK relative to its average. Regarding the other systemic risk measures, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in financial regulation uncertainty leads to 8.1%, 33.6%, 




respectively. Overall, these results suggest that more uncertainty regarding the financial 
regulations would lead banks to contribute more to systemic risk.  
Estimated coefficients on the controls are generally consistent with the 
expectations. Large banks create more systemic risk. Banks with lower Tier 1 capital ratio, 
lower asset quality in terms of higher non-performing loans ratio, lower management 
quality in terms of higher overhead costs ratio, lower earnings, lower liquidity in terms of 
less cash and security holdings, and higher sensitivity to market risk contribute more to 
systemic risk.  
There could be concerns about reverse causality regarding the main findings of this 
paper. If policymakers become aware that there is an increase in the systemic risk in the 
financial system, they might take an action beforehand to enact new financial regulation. 
Therefore, even though one quarter lagged financial regulation uncertainty is employed as 
the key independent variable in the analysis, reverse causality concerns may still be valid. 
As a commonly used approach, we employ the instrumental variable (IV) approach to 
mitigate these concerns. Regulatory uncertainty developed by Baker et al, (2016) is the IV 
in this paper. The keywords for regulatory uncertainty can be found in the Table 3.10. In 
case there is a general wave of regulation in the U.S. economy, financial markets may also 
be considered as the target for the next regulation action. In this situation, there might be 
an uncertainty created in the financial markets. Therefore, this IV satisfies the relevance 
condition. Regarding the exclusion restriction, one could not consider any apparent way 
how the regulatory uncertainty in other unrelated sectors should cause systemic risk 
contributions of banks in a way other than through its effect on financial regulation 




regulation uncertainty, the natural logarithm of the quarterly averages of monthly 
regulatory uncertainty index (ln_RegU) is employed in the analysis.  
In Table 3.3, we present the results regarding the IV analysis for the effect of 
financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of banks. The first step 
regression results in Column (1) display that the relevance condition holds. The second 
step results reported in Columns (2) – (6) show that the results from the main analysis 
presented in Table 3.2 are robust to the endogeneity concerns. Therefore, there is a positive 
relationship between the financial regulation uncertainty and systemic risk.  
The results regarding the underlying mechanisms of the effect of financial 
regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of banks are presented in Table 3.4. 
Column (1) displays the positive and highly significant (at 1% level) coefficient estimate 
for the financial regulation uncertainty on the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
(LLP Ratio). A one-standard-deviation increase in financial regulation uncertainty leads to 
a 23.5% increase in LLP Ratio relative to its average. Results in Column (2) indicates that 
as the financial regulation uncertainty increases, asset quality in terms of non-performing 
loans ratio of the banks decrease significantly. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
financial regulation uncertainty leads to a 31.6% increase in NPL Ratio relative to its 
average. These two mechanisms may suggest that financial regulation uncertainty has an 
adverse impact on banks’ loan portfolios.  
The effects of financial regulation on systemic risk contributions of banks may also 
function via the stock markets. A potential mechanism is that uncertainty would lead to a 
surge in the volatility of bank stock returns. Results reported in Column (3) suggest that 




increases the natural logarithm of one plus the standard deviation of bank stock returns 
(ln_Total_Risk). This effect is highly statistically significant (at 5% level) and it is 
economically significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in financial regulation 
uncertainty leads to a 21.3% increase in ln_Total_Risk relative to its average.  
Now, we turn our attention to the comparison between normal (non-crises) times 
versus crises times defined by Berger and Bouwman (2013) in Table 3.5. Columns (2), (6), 
and (10) display that the main effects presented in Table 3.2 stem primarily from the crises 
times for NSRISK, MES and ΔCOVAR since these effects are statistically significant. Yet, 
regarding SES and LVG, effects during the crises times are not significant. Besides, the 
effect of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of banks is mostly 
positive but not statistically significant during normal times. Overall, these results may 
provide supportive evidence for the importance of clear financial regulation in case of 
emergency.  
In Table 3.6, we focus on the differences among the banks according to their size 
classes defined by $10 billion and $50 billion cutoffs in the gross total assets (GTA). The 
results indicate that financial regulation uncertainty affects the systemic risk contribution 
of all bank types positively and significantly. On the other hand, the effects of financial 
uncertainty for large banks are the greatest among all as expected.  
In Table 3.7, we focus on the differences among banks according to their non-
performing loans ratio (NPL Ratio), liquidity ratio (Liquidity) and noninterest income ratio 
(Noninterest Income Ratio) defined by the median cutoffs in the corresponding 
distributions of these variables in the sample employed in this paper. In Table 3.7 Panel A, 




of non-performing loans ratio in total loans increase their systemic risk contributions as 
uncertainty in financial regulation increases. However, the effects for the lower asset 
quality banks (i.e., banks with higher non-performing loans ratio) are higher than those for 
the higher asset quality banks. The coefficients are statistically different from each other.  
In Table 3.7 Panel B, we report the results for banks with high and low liquidity 
ratio as the ratio of the sum of the cash and securities to their total assets. Results suggest 
that mostly the banks with below the median liquidity ratio significantly create more 
systemic risk after an increase in the uncertainty regarding the financial market regulations.  
In Table 3.7 Panel C, we document the results for banks with high and low 
noninterest income ratio as the ratio of noninterest income to total assets. Results suggest 
that mostly the banks with below the median noninterest income ratio significantly 
contribute more to systemic risk after financial regulation uncertainty is heightened.  
In Table 3.8, we present the results on the evolution of the financial regulation 
uncertainty effect over time. For the sake of brevity, only the results regarding the model 
where NSRISK is the dependent variable is reported. The lead values of systemic risk 
variables from one up to eight quarters are used as dependent variables in the regression 
analysis over time. For the NSRISK measure, positive and statistically significant effect of 
financial regulation uncertainty continues up to four quarters. In the unreported regression 
results, positive and statistically significant effects continue to hold up to four quarters 
regarding SES and LVG, and three quarters regarding MES and ΔCOVAR.  
There might be a concern about whether the uncertainty effect on systemic risk 
stems from only the uncertainty in the financial regulation. In other words, one needs to 




banks are isolated effects of financial regulation uncertainty from other types of uncertainty 
such as economic policy uncertainty, regulatory uncertainty or the uncertainty signaled by 
the different policy interest rates. To isolate the effects of uncertainty in financial 
regulation, we control for the above-mentioned variables in addition to the control variables 
in the main model specification.  
In Panel A of Table 3.9, we control for one-quarter lagged natural logarithm of the 
quarterly averages of monthly economic policy uncertainty index (ln_EPU t-1) developed 
by Baker et al. (2016). Positive and statistically significant effect of financial regulation 
uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of banks stays robust. Therefore, results may 
indicate that uncertainty in financial regulations is the main factor causing higher systemic 
risk in the markets instead of other types of uncertainty.  
In Panel B of Table 3.9, we control for the non-overlapping part of regulation 
uncertainty (RegU_residuals t-1) developed by Baker et al. (2016). The reason behind 
obtaining the non-overlapping part of regulation uncertainty from the financial regulation 
uncertainty is that regulation uncertainty covers all the keywords of financial regulation 
uncertainty. This non-overlapping part is the residuals from the regression of quarterly 
measure of regulation uncertainty on the quarterly measure of financial regulation 
uncertainty after controlling for seasonal dummies and with clustered errors at the year-
quarter level. Positive and statistically significant effect of financial regulation uncertainty 
on systemic risk contributions of banks stays robust after controlling for regulatory 
uncertainty.  
In Panel C of Table 3.9, we control for the natural logarithm of the Federal funds 




regulations but not the uncertainty caused by the signals of varying policy interest rates. 
Positive and statistically significant effect of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic 
risk contributions of banks is robust after controlling for Federal funds rate. Overall, results 
may suggest that uncertainty in financial regulations is the main contributor to the 
escalating systemic risk in the markets but not other types of uncertainty.  
3.6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Heightened uncertainty is associated with a more fragile financial system and is 
documented as a new source of systemic risk (Dicks & Fulghieri, 2019). Distorted investor 
sentiment due to the heightened uncertainty may create pessimism waves about unrelated 
asset classes or banks after a negative idiosyncratic shock to one asset class or bank. 
Uncertainty-avoidant investors may perform asset fire sales and lead to bank equity 
devaluations due to flight to quality effect (Caballero & Krishnamurthy, 2008; Uhlig, 
2010). With the help of these mechanisms, uncertainty-avoidant investors may help a 
negative idiosyncratic event to spill over onto other banks or asset and thus, increase the 
systemic risk.  
Healthy financial system can be supported by precise financial regulation enacted 
and implemented fast and efficiently. This is needed the most especially when there is a 
systemic buildup or even financial crisis since uncertainty in the economy is already 
widespread at those times. However, slow and uncertain crisis management during GFC 
was blamed for an extended recovery from the crisis (Stock & Watson, 2012; The Federal 
Open Market Committee, 2009; The IMF, 2012, 2013). Therefore, this paper investigates 




We employ the measure of financial regulation uncertainty developed by Baker et 
al. (2016) and widely-accepted measures of systemic risk. We employ a sample of 24,007 
bank-quarter observations from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. We find that financial regulatory 
uncertainty positively and significantly affects systemic risk contribution of banks in the 
U.S. These results are also economically significant and robust to the endogeneity 
concerns.  
There are two main mechanisms reported behind these findings. The first channel 
is the exacerbating bank loan portfolios evidenced by increased loan loss provisions ratio 
and non-performing loans ratio of banks. The second channel is the increased stock market 
volatility, which is weaker in economic sense compared to the loan portfolio channel.  
Adverse impact of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk is especially 
strengthened during the financial crises defined by Berger and Bouwman (2013) as these 
are the times when precise financial regulation is the most necessary. Furthermore, large 
banks are found to be most prominently impacted by the heightened uncertainty. Last but 
not least, our findings suggest that financial regulation uncertainty may slow down the 
economic recovery process since these documented negative impacts are valid in the longer 
terms up to three to four quarters.  
These findings have important policy implications. Policymakers should consider 
the design of financial regulation, primarily regarding its promptness, effectiveness, 
credibility and transparency as there is a trade-off between “correctness” of policy and its 
“decisiveness” (Bloom, 2009). It is crucial for regulatory bodies to manage emergent 
regulations in order to lower the odds of pessimism waves that could propagate a systemic 




effectiveness of regulatory intervention and depositors’ confidence levels (Ho & Saunders, 
1980). Therefore, to mitigate the deterioration of public confidence about the regulatory 
bodies and financial markets, crisis management along with the macroprudential policy 
initiatives would rather be designed as proactive and pre-emptive rather than reactive 
during the crisis or right after the crisis (Ilin & Varga, 2015). Otherwise, any sub-systemic 
reaction to the crisis would constitute a new source of systemic risk given its negative 
feedback loop, instead of being a remedy for the systemic event (Ilin & Varga, 2015). 
Besides, it is important to note that systemic buildup seems to be more likely for large 
banks rather than small banks (Ho & Saunders, 1980) which sets a basis for “too-big-to-












Table 3.1: Summary Statistics  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for variables 
 
This table presents summary statistics, and correlations for the variables employed in the 
analyses. Sample includes 840 banks from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Observations are at bank-
year-quarter level. All variables are described in Table 3.10. Panel A presents descriptive 
statistics for all variables used in the analyses whereas Panel B reports Pearson correlation 
coefficients across dependent variables and key independent variable. Variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% level.  
 N Mean StDev 25th 
Percentile  
Median  75th 
Percentile 
Dependent variables        
NSRISK  24,007 0.020 1.223 -0.381 -0.241 -0.002 
SES  24,007 0.428 0.776 0.212 0.276 0.391 
MES  24,007 0.014 0.015 0.004 0.009 0.018 
LVG  24,007 1.107 1.937 0.569 0.730 1.014 
ΔCOVAR 24,007 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.006 
Key independent variable 
ln_FinRegU 24,007 4.124 0.941 3.423 3.831 4.917 
Control variables 
Capital Adequacy  24,007 0.827 0.252 0.713 0.797 0.898 
NPL Ratio 24,007 1.246 1.873 0.369 0.712 1.356 
Overhead Cost Ratio 24,007 0.035 0.026 0.018 0.032 0.046 
Earnings 24,007 2.288 2.856 1.176 2.296 3.607 
Liquidity 24,007 0.254 0.114 0.176 0.243 0.317 
Sensitivity to Market 
Risk 24,007 0.163 0.127 0.065 0.138 0.232 
Noninterest Income 
Ratio 24,007 0.816 2.464 0.286 0.533 0.911 
Bank Size 24,007 14.265 1.640 13.151 13.920 15.037 
HHI 24,007 0.108 0.060 0.073 0.101 0.131 
Variables for 
robustness        
ln_EPU 24,007 4.411 0.372 4.136 4.261 4.690 
ln_Fed_rate 24,007 0.820 1.146 0.360 1.381 1.663 
RegU_residuals 24,007 -8.135 24.566 -25.335 -12.591 5.032 
Variables for 
channels       
LLP Ratio  24,007 0.004 0.026 0.001 0.002 0.004 
ln_Total_Risk  24,007 0.025 0.019 0.015 0.020 0.029 
Variables for 
subsamples       
Crises dummy 24,007 0.365 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Instrumental variable       





Panel B: Correlation matrix for key variables 
Correlations with *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 NSRISK SES MES LVG ΔCOVAR ln_FinRegU 
NSRISK  1.000      
SES  0.954*** 1.000     
MES  0.274*** 0.174*** 1.000    
LVG  0.954*** 1.000*** 0.173*** 1.000   
ΔCOVAR 0.180*** 0.090*** 0.838*** 0.089*** 1.000  








Table 3.2: Financial Regulation Uncertainty on Systemic Risk  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables NRISK SES MES LVG ΔCOVAR 
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.114*** 0.037* 0.005*** 0.089* 0.001*** 
 (2.86) (1.86) (2.94) (1.80) (2.69) 
Capital Adequacy t-1 -0.686*** -0.452*** 0.005*** -1.130*** 0.000 
 (-2.95) (-3.01) (2.82) (-3.01) (1.10) 
NPL Ratio t-1 0.286*** 0.183*** 0.000 0.458*** 0.000** 
 (6.04) (5.38) (1.29) (5.38) (2.19) 
Overhead Cost Ratio t-1 -2.036 -1.142 0.053 -2.945 0.032* 
 (-0.64) (-0.60) (0.98) (-0.62) (1.90) 
Earnings t-1 -0.132*** -0.074*** -0.000 -0.184*** -0.000* 
 (-5.25) (-4.39) (-1.41) (-4.39) (-1.77) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.235 -0.002 -0.022*** 0.003 -0.005*** 
 (-0.82) (-0.01) (-3.35) (0.01) (-3.02) 
Sensitivity to Market Risk t-1 0.247* 0.092 0.006* 0.226 0.003*** 
 (1.89) (1.24) (1.70) (1.22) (2.70) 
Noninterest Income Ratio t-1 0.069** 0.037* -0.000 0.094* -0.000 
 (2.12) (1.70) (-0.48) (1.71) (-1.59) 
Bank Size t-1 0.060 -0.002 0.007*** -0.005 0.000 
 (1.18) (-0.07) (6.79) (-0.06) (0.88) 
HHI t-1 0.521 0.276 0.003 0.687 0.002 
 (1.57) (1.18) (0.81) (1.18) (1.37) 
      
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 









This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of systemic risk contributions of banks on natural logarithm of quarterly 
financial regulation uncertainty (ln_FinRegU t-1), and controls. Sample includes 840 banks from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. All variables are 
described in Tables 3.1 and 3.10 and lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered 










Table 3.3: Instrumental Variable Analysis  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variables ln_FinRegUt-1 NRISK SES MES LVG ΔCOVAR 
ln_RegU t-1 1.469***      
 (219.54)      
ln_FinRegU t-1  0.151*** 0.048* 0.005*** 0.116* 0.001*** 
  (4.11) (1.92) (17.95) (1.85) (18.70) 
       
F-test Stats 464.780      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 
Adj.R-squared 0.754 0.533 0.473 0.513 0.472 0.634 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates for the instrumental variable (IV) analysis on the effects of financial regulation uncertainty on 
systemic risk contributions of banks. The instrument is the natural logarithm of the quarterly regulatory uncertainty (ln_RegU t-1) 
developed by Baker et al. (2016). Controls include Capital Adequacy t-1, NPL Ratio t-1, Overhead Cost Ratio t-1, Earnings t-1, Liquidity t-
1, Sensitivity to Market Risk t-1, Noninterest Income Ratio t-1, Bank Size t-1, and HHI t-1. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. 
Sample includes 840 banks from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 3.1 and 3.10 and lagged one quarter. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank and year-quarter level. Statistical significance at 









Table 3.4: Underlying Mechanisms  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables LLP Ratio NPL Ratio ln_Total_Risk 
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.001*** 0.425*** 0.005** 
 (3.00) (4.24) (2.60) 
Capital Adequacy t-1 0.002 -0.008* -0.005* 
 (0.70) (-1.88) (-1.78) 
NPL Ratio t-1   0.198** 
   (2.07) 
Overhead Cost Ratio t-1 -0.180 -0.103 -0.001*** 
 (-1.45) (-1.05) (-2.86) 
Earnings t-1 -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.024*** 
 (-2.89) (-4.92) (-2.68) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.001 0.002 0.012** 
 (-0.19) (0.26) (2.58) 
Sensitivity to Market Risk t-1 0.002 0.011*** -0.001 
 (0.73) (3.65) (-1.55) 
Noninterest Income Ratio t-1 0.002* 0.002** -0.001 
 (1.90) (2.43) (-0.54) 
Bank Size t-1 0.002* 0.004*** 0.004 
 (1.81) (3.13) (0.70) 
HHI t-1 -0.000 -0.000 0.005** 
 (-0.04) (-0.07) (2.60) 
    
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 









This table presents the regression results for the underlying mechanisms behind the effects of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic 
risk contributions of banks. Dependent variables are the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP Ratio), ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans (NPL Ratio), and the natural logarithm of one plus the standard deviation of a specific bank’s stock returns in a given 
quarter (ln_Total_Risk), respectively. NPL Ratio t-1 is not included as a control variable for the models where LLP Ratio and NPL Ratio 
are the dependent variables. Sample includes 840 banks from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 3.1 and 3.10 
and lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank and year-quarter level. 








Table 3.5: Crises vs Normal Times  
 
 Dep. = NSRISK Dep. = SES Dep. = MES Dep. = LVG Dep. = ΔCOVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Normal Crises Normal Crises Normal Crises Normal Crises Normal Crises 
           
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.014 0.150** -0.015 0.050 0.001*** 0.008*** -0.039 0.121 0.000* 0.002** 
 (0.52) (2.19) (-0.76) (1.48) (3.22) (3.01) (-0.80) (1.43) (1.92) (2.60) 
           
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,239 8,768 15,239 8,768 15,239 8,768 15,239 8,768 15,239 8,768 
Adj.R-squared 0.518 0.586 0.456 0.524 0.662 0.603 0.455 0.523 0.819 0.683 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of systemic risk contributions of banks on natural logarithm of quarterly 
financial regulation uncertainty (ln_FinRegU t-1), and controls during normal versus crises times. Normal and Crises are dummy 
variables indicating the sample periods where Berger and Bouwman (2013) define non-crisis times and crisis times, respectively. 
Controls include Capital Adequacy t-1, NPL Ratio t-1, Overhead Cost Ratio t-1, Earnings t-1, Liquidity t-1, Sensitivity to Market Risk t-1, 
Noninterest Income Ratio t-1, Bank Size t-1, and HHI t-1. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. Sample includes 840 banks from 
1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 3.1 and 3.10 and lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
and are based on standard errors clustered at bank and year-quarter level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
















Table 3.6: Main Regression Results by Bank Size Classes  
 
 Dep. = NSRISK Dep. = SES Dep. = MES 




















                 
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.112*** 0.122* 0.269*** 0.041** 0.031 0.102*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 
 (2.99) (1.76) (3.24) (2.14) (0.72) (2.65) (2.81) (3.45) (3.06) 
          
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,517 1,923 1,567 20,517 1,923 1,567 20,517 1,923 1,567 
Adj.R-squared 0.542 0.529 0.923 0.486 0.438 0.938 0.540 0.487 0.325 
 
 Dep. = LVG Dep. = ΔCOVAR 














              
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.100** 0.073 0.251** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (2.08) (0.68) (2.63) (2.60) (3.06) (2.84) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,517 1,923 1,567 20,517 1,923 1,567 









This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of systemic risk contributions of banks on natural logarithm of quarterly 
financial regulation uncertainty (ln_FinRegU t-1), and controls by bank size classes. Banks are categorized into small, medium, and large 
classes with cutoff values of $10 billion and $50 billion of gross total assets (GTA). Controls include Capital Adequacy t-1, NPL Ratio t-
1, Overhead Cost Ratio t-1, Earnings t-1, Liquidity t-1, Sensitivity to Market Risk t-1, Noninterest Income Ratio t-1, Bank Size t-1, and HHI t-1. 
Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. Sample includes 840 banks from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. All variables are described in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.10 and lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank 














Table 3.7: Main Regression Results by Various Bank Classes  
 
Panel A: The effects of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of banks by non-performing loans ratio classes 
 Dep. = NSRISK Dep. = SES Dep. = MES Dep. = LVG Dep. = ΔCOVAR 
































           
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.071*** 0.176*** 0.025*** 0.071** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.060*** 0.173** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (4.31) (3.20) (3.82) (2.47) (2.82) (2.94) (3.73) (2.43) (2.29) (2.69) 
           
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 








Panel B: The effects of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of banks by liquidity ratio classes 
 Dep. = NSRISK Dep. = SES Dep. = MES Dep. = LVG Dep. = ΔCOVAR 
































           
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.180*** 0.038 0.079*** -0.008 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.194*** -0.023 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (3.24) (1.38) (2.70) (-0.50) (3.27) (2.76) (2.66) (-0.57) (3.24) (2.21) 
           
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 









Panel C: The effects of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of banks by noninterest income ratio classes 
 Dep. = NSRISK Dep. = SES Dep. = MES Dep. = LVG Dep. = ΔCOVAR 










































           
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.165*** 0.065 0.066** 0.012 0.004*** 0.005** 0.160** 0.027 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (3.26) (1.56) (2.59) (0.52) (2.72) (2.54) (2.55) (0.47) (2.75) (2.28) 
           
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 12,004 12,003 
Adj.R-squared 0.570 0.495 0.502 0.440 0.550 0.480 0.501 0.439 0.709 0.568 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of systemic risk contributions of banks on natural logarithm of quarterly 
financial regulation uncertainty (ln_FinRegU t-1), and controls by bank classes on non-performing loans ratio (NPL Ratio) in Panel A, 
liquidity ratio (Liquidity) in Panel B, and noninterest income ratio (Noninterest Income Ratio) in Panel C. Non-performing loans ratio 
(NPL Ratio) is the ratio of the non-performing loans to total loans. Liquidity ratio (Liquidity) is the ratio of the sum of the cash and 
securities to total assets. Noninterest income ratio (Noninterest Income Ratio) is the ratio of noninterest income to total assets. In all 
panels, sets of banks corresponding to low and high values of the related variable are determined with the help of the median of that 
specific variable. Controls include Capital Adequacy t-1, NPL Ratio t-1, Overhead Cost Ratio t-1, Earnings t-1, Liquidity t-1, Sensitivity to 
Market Risk t-1, Noninterest Income Ratio t-1, Bank Size t-1, and HHI t-1. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. Sample includes 
840 banks from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 3.1 and 3.10 and lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank and year-quarter level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 










Table 3.8: Effects Over Time 
 
 Dependent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NSRISKt NSRISKt+1 NSRISKt+2 NSRISKt+3 NSRISKt+4 NSRISKt+5 NSRISKt+6 NSRISKt+7 
                
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.114*** 0.122** 0.111** 0.106** 0.074 0.058 -0.002 -0.045 
 (2.86) (2.59) (2.41) (2.36) (1.62) (1.19) (-0.04) (-0.76) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,007 23,167 22,345 21,549 20,760 19,994 19,252 18,533 
Adj.R-squared 0.533 0.493 0.454 0.424 0.400 0.365 0.340 0.324 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of systemic risk contributions of banks on natural logarithm of quarterly 
financial regulation uncertainty (ln_FinRegU t-1), and controls over time. Controls include Capital Adequacy t-1, NPL Ratio t-1, Overhead 
Cost Ratio t-1, Earnings t-1, Liquidity t-1, Sensitivity to Market Risk t-1, Noninterest Income Ratio t-1, Bank Size t-1, and HHI t-1. Coefficients 
on Controls are omitted for brevity. Likewise, only the results of the regression models where the dependent variables are NSRISK is 
displayed in the table for the sake of brevity. Sample includes 840 banks from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 
3.1 and 3.10 and lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at bank and year-





Table 3.9: Other Types of Uncertainty and Policy Interest Rate 
 
Panel A: The effects of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of 
banks after controlling for economic policy uncertainty 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables NRISK SES MES LVG ΔCOVAR 
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.126*** 0.047** 0.005** 0.114** 0.001** 
 (3.49) (2.60) (2.42) (2.58) (2.14) 
ln_EPU t-1 -0.033 -0.027 -0.001 -0.071 -0.000 
 (-0.41) (-0.68) (-0.31) (-0.72) (-0.33) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 
Adj.R-squared 0.533 0.473 0.513 0.472 0.635 
 
 
Panel B: The effects of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of 
banks after controlling for regulation uncertainty 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables NRISK SES MES LVG ΔCOVAR 
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.115** 0.041** 0.006*** 0.098* 0.001*** 
 (2.62) (2.00) (3.37) (1.94) (2.93) 
RegU_residuals t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000** 
 (-0.10) (-0.53) (-3.05) (-0.52) (-2.34) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,960 23,960 23,960 23,960 23,960 





Panel C: The effects of financial regulation uncertainty on systemic risk contributions of 
banks after controlling for Federal funds rate 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables NRISK SES MES LVG ΔCOVAR 
ln_FinRegU t-1 0.090** 0.038** 0.005** 0.091* 0.001** 
 (2.57) (2.02) (2.57) (1.97) (2.43) 
ln_Fed_rate t-1 -0.045 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.000 
 (-1.00) (0.06) (0.69) (0.07) (0.87) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 
Adj.R-squared 0.534 0.473 0.515 0.472 0.637 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of systemic risk contributions of 
banks on natural logarithm of quarterly financial regulation uncertainty (ln_FinRegU t-1), 
and bank-level control variables as well as other types of uncertainty and policy interest 
rate. Panel A presents the coefficient estimates from the main regression after controlling 
for the natural logarithm of quarterly economic policy uncertainty (ln_EPU t-1) by Baker et 
al. (2016). Panel B reports the coefficient estimates from the same main regression model 
specification by controlling for the non-overlapping part of regulation uncertainty 
(RegU_residuals t-1) of Baker et al. (2016). This non-overlapping part is the residuals from 
the regression of quarterly measure of regulation uncertainty on the quarterly measure of 
financial regulation uncertainty after controlling for seasonal dummies and with clustered 
errors at the year-quarter level. Panel C presents the coefficient estimates from the same 
main regression model specification after controlling for the natural logarithm of the 
Federal funds rate (ln_Fed_rate t-1). Each quarter indicator of monthly measured index is 
calculated by taking the average of that index during the corresponding months in a specific 
quarter. Controls include Capital Adequacy t-1, NPL Ratio t-1, Overhead Cost Ratio t-1, 
Earnings t-1, Liquidity t-1, Sensitivity to Market Risk t-1, Noninterest Income Ratio t-1, Bank 
Size t-1, and HHI t-1. Coefficients on Controls are omitted for brevity. Sample includes 840 
banks from 1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4. All variables are described in Tables 3.1 and 3.10 and 
lagged one quarter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered at bank and year-quarter level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 









Table 3.10: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variables   
   
NSRISK SRISK is the conditional capital shortfall measure of systemic risk, developed 
by Acharya et al. (2010) and refined by Brownlees and Engle (2015). This 
measure shows the capital shortfall of a bank conditional on a severe market 
decline, and is a function of its size, leverage and risk. Quarterly averages of 
daily SRISK measures are normalized with the quarterly averages of daily 
market capitalization for each bank and then denoted with NSRISK.  
Estimated 
SES SES is defined as a “bank’s propensity to be undercapitalized when the 
system as a whole is undercapitalized” (Acharya et al., 2017, p.2). SES 
measures expected amount of undercapitalization of a bank in a possible 
future undercapitalized state of the whole system.  
Estimated 
MES Capital shortfall in stock markets is indicated with MES, which captures “the 
average return of each bank during the 5% worst days for the market” 
(Acharya et al., 2017, p.4), where the market return is the CRSP value-
weighted return. 
Estimated 
LVG Capital shortfall in debt market is measured via an approximation for 
leverage, which is the ratio of quasi-market value of assets to market value of 
equity (Acharya et al., 2017).  
Estimated 
ΔCOVAR Conditional value at risk (CoVaR) is defined as the value at risk (VaR) of an 
individual bank conditional on the other banks in the system being in financial 
distress (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2016). However, each banks’ individual 
contribution to systemic risk is measured by the difference in conditional 
value at risk (CoVaR) and VaR, which is denoted as ΔCoVaR in the literature. 
This daily measure is aggregated at the quarterly level by taking the averages 
of daily measures at the corresponding quarter.  
Estimated 
   








Key independent variables 
   
ln_FinRegU The natural logarithm of the quarterly averages of monthly uncertainty in the 
financial regulation environment measured by Baker et al. (2016). It is 
measured by using the following keywords: “banking (or bank) supervision, 
Glass-Steagall, TARP, thrift supervision, Dodd-Frank, financial reform, 
commodity futures trading commission, CFTC, House Financial Services 
Committee, Basel, capital requirement, Volcker rule, bank stress test, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, deposit insurance, FDIC, 
FSLIC, OTS, OCC, FIRREA”.  
Baker et al. (2016) 




   
Capital Adequacy The ratio of Tier 1 capital to gross total assets for each bank in a given quarter. 
This variable is multiplied with 10,000.  
Call Reports 
NPL Ratio The ratio of the non-performing loans to total loans for each bank in a given 
quarter. This variable is multiplied with 100.  
Call Reports 
Overhead Cost Ratio The ratio of total operating expenses to gross total assets for each bank in a 
given quarter. 
Call Reports 
Earnings The ratio of return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of the annualized 
net income, to gross total assets for each bank in a given quarter. This variable 
is multiplied with 100.  
Call Reports 
Liquidity The ratio of the sum of the cash and securities to total assets for each bank in 
a given quarter. 
Call Reports 
Sensitivity to Market Risk The ratio of the absolute difference between short-term assets and short-term 
liabilities to gross total assets for each bank in a given quarter.  
Call Reports 
Noninterest Income Ratio The ratio of noninterest income to total assets for each bank in a given quarter. 









Bank Size The natural log of the gross total assets of a bank defined as the total asset 
plus allowance for loan and lease losses plus allocated transfer risk reserve (a 
reserve for certain foreign loans) in $1000. 
Call Reports 
HHI A bank-level competition measure calculated as a weighted average of the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index in all areas (Metropolitan Statistical Area 
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Variables for robustness    
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